New Measures for "Dishonest" Punishment by the Supreme People's Court at the Two Sessions in 2025 (Part 1): Classification and Grading of Dishonest Punishment

2025 03/18

On March 10, 2025, Huang Wenjun, Director of the Executive Bureau of the Supreme People's Court, made this statement in a series of live interviews with all media outlets interpreting the "Work Report of the Supreme People's Court" at the Two Sessions, and introduced the new measures of the People's Court in the field of credit punishment - promoting the classification and grading of credit punishment, establishing grace periods, and single lifting mechanisms.



On March 10, 2025, a series of all media live interviews were conducted to interpret the work report of the Supreme People's Court during the Two Sessions


This is not only a systemic turning point after the joint punishment mechanism for dishonesty in 2016, but also marks the transformation of judicial enforcement from the governance concept of "one size fits all height limits and dishonesty" to "flexible law enforcement". A credit punishment 2.0 system with "graded diagnosis and treatment, grace relief, and dynamic unlocking" as its core has emerged, revealing the biggest change in China's credit punishment system in the past decade.






January 2016 Joint Punishment Mechanism for Dishonesty: Restricting High Consumption, Government Procurement, and More than 100 Measures in 11 Categories

This article will interpret one of the new measures for "dishonesty" punishment by the Supreme People's Court of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 2025: the classification and grading of dishonesty punishment.



1、 Three level management of dishonesty: building a "diagnosis and treatment system" for dishonest behavior

In the past, it was "natural" to include the executed person who had no assets available for execution in the list of dishonest persons after filing the case. But now in newly filed enforcement cases, the inclusion of the executed person as dishonest will be more cautious, and in practice, the enforcement scale of dishonest measures in courts across the country is tightening.

On March 10, 2025, the Supreme People's Court emphasized during the Two Sessions that the executed person does not equal the dishonest executed person. The person subject to enforcement can only be included in the list of dishonest persons if they have one of the six situations stipulated by the following laws: obstructing or resisting enforcement by forging evidence, violence, threats, etc., evading enforcement by false litigation, false arbitration, or concealing or transferring property. If it is only due to "lack of money" or "overdue", it is no longer sufficient to be included in the dishonesty list.





In the 2025 Two Sessions, the Supreme Court emphasized that the executed person does not equal the dishonest executed person


According to Article 1 of the "Several Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Disclosure of Information on the List of Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement" (2017), if the person subject to enforcement fails to fulfill the obligations determined by effective legal documents and falls under any of the following circumstances, the people's court shall include them in the list of dishonest persons subject to enforcement and impose credit penalties on them in accordance with the law: (1) those who have the ability to fulfill the obligations determined by effective legal documents but refuse to do so; (2) Obstructing or resisting execution through methods such as forging evidence, violence, threats, etc; (3) Using false litigation, false arbitration, or concealing or transferring property to evade enforcement; (4) Violating the property reporting system; (5) Violating the consumption restriction order; (6) Refusing to fulfill the settlement agreement without justifiable reasons.

According to Article 2 of the "Several Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Disclosure of Information on the List of Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement", if the person subject to enforcement falls under the circumstances specified in Items 2 to 6 of Article 1 of these Provisions, the period for inclusion in the list of dishonest persons subject to enforcement is two years. If the executed person obstructs or resists the execution by violence or threats, or if the circumstances are serious or if there are multiple acts of dishonesty, the period may be extended for one to three years. If the dishonest debtor actively fulfills the obligations determined by the effective legal documents or actively corrects the dishonest behavior, the people's court may decide to delete the dishonest information in advance.

In terms of the classification of dishonesty management, different periods of punishment will be given according to the severity of the dishonest behavior of the executed person. For the executed person with minor breach of trust, the punishment period is relatively short; For those who have serious breaches of trust and maliciously evade execution, the punishment period will be extended and the punishment intensity will be increased. This grading and classification mechanism can not only accurately crack down on serious dishonest behavior, but also provide opportunities for credit repair to those who have less dishonest circumstances.

2、 The standard for three-level management of dishonesty

1. One of the three levels of handling standards: strict punishment for malicious evasion of debts

Malicious debt evasion situations such as disappearance of contact, transfer of property, false reporting of income, refusal to negotiate, confrontation with law enforcement, and multiple breaches of trust can easily be included in the blacklist of dishonesty. Moreover, those who maliciously evade debts through false litigation, refusal of enforcement, and other means will be severely punished.





As of March 17, 2025, there are still 8.51 million dishonest persons who have been executed on the China Execution Information Disclosure Network

2. Level 3 Handling Standard 2: Flexible Handling of Objective Performance Obstacles

The purpose is to provide institutional protection for the 'honest but unfortunate' group. After being included in the blacklist of dishonest individuals, it is easy for them to slide directly from economic hardship to social death. Therefore, for those who objectively have difficulty fulfilling their obligations, they should be given a certain amount of time and opportunity, emphasizing good faith, effective, and reasonable execution, rather than a one size fits all "punishment to the end".

If a manufacturing enterprise is recognized as having restructuring value due to its technological advantages, it did not directly adopt measures such as height restrictions and dishonesty. Instead, it introduced strategic investment through the implementation of a linkage mechanism, which not only resolved the 250 million yuan debt crisis but also retained more than 400 job opportunities.

3. Level 3 processing standard three: repair space for procedural defects

Set up a fault tolerance mechanism for non subjective dishonest behaviors such as "failure to sign legal documents", and provide the executed person with time and opportunity to correct the mistake.

If a debtor is applied for inclusion in the dishonesty list due to loss of contact, the court will review their medical records and initiate a grace period procedure, ultimately leading to debt settlement.

3、 Risk of loss of control in credit rating management

1. Practical difficulties in quantifying indicators for credit rating

The dynamic adjustment of punitive measures by various grassroots courts based on debt scale, default duration, property clues, etc. may lead to regional differences in enforcement in different provinces and cities.

In 2024, a large number of cross execution cases were upgraded due to the inconsistent standards of the original execution court, which also indicates that there are challenges in the implementation of the credit rating system.

2. The transformation of the operation of "replacing execution with adjustment"

Some regions excessively apply mediation to cases with obvious suspicion of debt evasion in order to pursue the rate of debt settlement, and refuse to take dishonest measures.

As reported by a certain building materials supplier, its 20 million yuan receivable was forcibly repaid over 20 years under the name of "debt restructuring" to avoid local enterprises breaking their promises, but it actually harmed the rights and interests of creditors.

4、 How should creditors respond to the situation of graded management of dishonesty

The Work Report of the Supreme People's Court during the Two Sessions heavily disclosed the key data of a 23.4% decrease in the number of people on the dishonesty list for the first time in ten years in 2024. Could it be that the number of dishonest individuals subject to enforcement has really decreased? Is it also possible that the court has become stricter in imposing disciplinary measures for dishonesty?


The number of dishonest persons subject to enforcement in 2024 has decreased for the first time in 10 years

The number of people on the dishonesty list has decreased, while the number of people on the credit repair list has increased. The flexibility and warmth of the court have a positive effect on economic development. But for creditors, they cannot rely on the pressure of the "blacklist of dishonesty" to make debtors fulfill their obligations as before.

As a creditor, one should require the other party to provide guarantees or clear property clues before the creditor's rights arise. During the litigation stage, property preservation should be carried out, and an integrated plan for litigation and enforcement should be formulated. At the same time, multiple enforcement measures should be combined, rather than relying solely on measures of dishonesty and height limits.

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