Looking towards the future, the design of China's environmental and data legal policies should be at the forefront of the times, daring to integrate the wisdom of the Coase theorem with the solid foundation of traditional regulatory methods, and weave a rule of law network that pursues efficiency and defends fairness. Only in this way can we find a stable and innovative path in the complex game of environment and data protection, and build a comprehensive and efficient legal framework. Through precise property rights definition and sophisticated market mechanism construction, we can not only achieve the optimal allocation of resources, but also unleash the infinite potential of social development, leading us towards a bright future of sustainable development and illuminating every corner with the light of social welfare.

This article explores the Coase theorem proposed by Ronald Coase in "The Social Cost Problem" and its applications in contract law, data law, and environmental law. The Coase theorem holds that in the absence of transaction costs, the optimal allocation of resources is not affected by the initial allocation of property rights. In data law, the Coase theorem emphasizes optimizing data resource allocation through market mechanisms and protecting the rights and interests of data subjects; In environmental law, new ideas are provided to address cross-border pollution. The article also evaluates the limitations of the Coase theorem in practical applications, such as transaction costs, market failures, and the improvement of legal frameworks. Although the Coase theorem provides valuable insights, practical applications require a combination of real-world situations and comprehensive consideration of various factors to achieve optimal resource allocation and maximize social welfare.

Ronald Coase, the 1991 Nobel laureate in economics, is renowned for his paper "The Problem of Social Cost" published in 1960. This milestone article not only established Coase's lofty position in the economic community, but also sparked widespread attention and discussion in the legal community. Coase proposed a new perspective in the article to examine the relationship between legal rules and economic efficiency, known as the famous Coase theorem. This theorem asserts that in an ideal situation where there are no transaction costs, the initial allocation of private property rights will not affect the optimal allocation of resources. This theory not only subverts the traditional legal understanding of the role of legal rules, but also has a profound impact on the theory and practice of contract law.

The proposal of the Coase theorem marks an important dialogue between law and economics, opening a new chapter in the interdisciplinary field of law and economics. Through this theorem, Coase not only revealed the core role of transaction costs in resource allocation, but also provided new theoretical foundations and practical guidelines for the formulation of laws and economic policies. The Coase theorem has not only sparked extensive research and discussion in academia, but also demonstrated enormous potential in practical applications.

In various fields such as environmental law and data law, the Coase theorem provides new ideas and methods for solving complex legal and economic problems. By defining clear property rights and utilizing market mechanisms, the Coase theorem helps us understand how to find the optimal balance between economic efficiency and legal rules, thereby achieving the optimal allocation of resources and maximizing social welfare. Whether in theoretical research or practical operation, the Coase theorem provides us with a new analytical framework, enabling us to gain a deeper understanding of the subtle relationship between law and economics.

The core principle of Coase's theorem

The core of the Coase theorem lies in its assumption of transaction costs and its discussion of resource allocation efficiency. In an idealized model, when transaction costs are zero, regardless of how the law determines the ownership of property rights, both private parties can always negotiate to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. This means that even if the initial distribution of property rights is unfair, market mechanisms can still encourage resources to flow to the entities that can most effectively utilize them, thereby maximizing economic efficiency.

A classic example of the Coase theorem is railway sparks and agricultural fires. Assuming that sparks generated by trains operated by railway companies may trigger fires in adjacent farmland. If the law stipulates that railway companies are responsible for fire losses, then railway companies will have the incentive to take more preventive measures to reduce the probability of fire occurrence. However, if the law stipulates that farmers are responsible for their own fire losses, they will tend to take more protective measures, such as establishing fire-resistant belts or using fire-resistant materials. However, in an ideal world without transaction costs, regardless of how the law determines the attribution of responsibility, railway companies and farmers can find the optimal solution through negotiation. This viewpoint overturns the traditional view that legal rules directly affect economic behavior and proposes the concept of "allocation invariance", which means that rights ultimately flow into the hands of users who can create the greatest value.

Although the assumption of a perfect world in Coase's theorem is difficult to implement in reality, this theory provides us with an analytical framework that helps us understand the subtle relationship between legal rules and economic efficiency. Especially in the field of contract law, the Coase theorem prompts us to re-examine the essence of contractual obligations and the economic logic behind breach of contract.

Basic Applications of Coase Theorem

The impact of the Coase theorem on contract law is reflected in the reinterpretation of contractual obligations, particularly the transition from bilateral to trilateral obligations. Traditionally, contractual obligations are seen as an agreement between two parties, whereby one party either fulfills the agreement or pays corresponding damages. However, the Coase theorem introduces a third possibility: under certain conditions, the contracting parties may change the original contract terms through negotiation, or even terminate the contract, without strictly adhering to the original obligations or damage compensation rules.

For example, consider the painting contract between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Ronald Coase. If Holmes agrees to paint a portrait of Coase at a certain price, but before the contract is executed, another client is willing to commission Coase to paint at a higher price, then Coase can theoretically negotiate with Holmes to terminate the original contract by paying additional fees in pursuit of higher economic benefits. This indicates that in an ideal environment without transaction costs, contractual obligations are not only choices of performance or compensation, but also include the possibility of achieving more efficient resource allocation through negotiation.

In addition, the Coase theorem provides a new interpretation of contractual breaches. When the compensation for damages is high, theoretically, the cost of contract breach will suppress the occurrence of breach behavior; However, from the perspective of Coase's theorem, high compensation for damages does not prevent all breaches, as the contracting parties may negotiate to pay a certain amount of "bribe" to avoid the original contract and achieve better allocation of resources. Similarly, when the compensation for damages is low, although it may seem to encourage breach of contract, in reality, the contracting parties will still choose the most favorable course of action based on economic rationality to ensure overall efficiency is not compromised.

The application of the Coase theorem in contract law has expanded our understanding of contractual obligations and breach of contract. It indicates that the contracting parties can not only resolve disputes by fulfilling the contract or paying damages, but also find more efficient solutions through negotiation. This perspective prompts us to re-examine the core principles of contract law and provides new ideas for the formulation of legal policies.

In summary, the Coase theorem provides us with a new analytical tool by revealing the relationship between transaction costs and resource allocation efficiency. It not only changed our understanding of legal rules and economic behavior, but also had a profound impact in the field of contract law. By understanding the Coase theorem, we can better grasp the interaction between law and economy, thereby formulating more effective legal policies, promoting the optimal allocation of resources, and improving economic efficiency.

The Deep Application of Coase Theorem in Environmental Law and Data Legislation

The essence of the Coase theorem lies in its insight into transaction costs and innovative ideas for solving externalities through market mechanisms. In environmental law and data legislation, this theory not only provides a new analytical framework, but also promotes a series of institutional innovations aimed at promoting effective allocation and protection of resources through clarifying property rights and market mechanisms.

Environmental Law: From Command and Control to Market Orientation

In the field of environmental governance, traditional command and control strategies, although directly effective, often overlook economic efficiency and market flexibility. The introduction of the Coase theorem has opened up new paths for environmental policy design, especially in dealing with typical externalities such as pollution. By defining clear property rights, such as emission rights, Coase's theorem advocates the use of market mechanisms to achieve optimal cost-effectiveness in pollution control. This method not only has theoretical appeal, but also demonstrates its unique advantages in practical operation.

Emissions Trading System (ETS)

The Emissions Trading System (ETS) is one of the most intuitive applications of the Coase theorem in environmental policy. ETS first sets a total upper limit for pollutant emissions, and then allocates or auctions emission rights to various enterprises. Enterprises can freely buy and sell these emission rights in the market, which encourages efficient emission reduction companies to sell excess quotas, while companies with higher emission reduction costs buy quotas to meet the emission cap requirements. This mechanism not only improves the overall efficiency of emission reduction, but also provides flexible incentive mechanisms for enterprises to encourage technological innovation and environmental investment. Through such market-oriented means, not only can effective control of pollutants be achieved, but a balance point can also be found between economic development and environmental protection.

The core concept of ETS is to achieve optimal allocation of resources through market mechanisms. Firstly, the government or regulatory agencies set emission limits and restrict the total emissions to ensure the achievement of environmental goals. Then, the emission quotas are allocated to enterprises, which can be obtained through auctions, free allocation, or mixed methods. Enterprises can make decisions based on their own cost-effectiveness in the process of emission reduction: those enterprises with low emission reduction costs can save quotas by reducing emissions and sell the excess quotas to enterprises in need; And those enterprises with high emission reduction costs can meet emission requirements by purchasing quotas.

This market-oriented emission control mechanism not only improves the overall efficiency of emission reduction, but also provides flexible incentive mechanisms for enterprises to encourage technological innovation and environmental investment. For example, some companies may invest in cleaner production technologies or processes to reduce emissions and gain a competitive advantage in the market. At the same time, ETS can also reflect pollution costs through market price signals, prompting companies to pay more attention to environmental protection.

Tradable license

Similar to ETS, the tradable license system is also based on the principle of Coase's theorem, allowing businesses to conduct transactions among themselves by issuing a limited number of licenses to achieve optimal pollution control effects. This method also reduces overall compliance costs and promotes sustainable management of environmental resources. Through license trading, enterprises can more freely arrange production, find the most economical way to reduce emissions, and promote the green transformation and long-term development of the entire industry.

The implementation of the tradable permit system first requires a clear total control target for pollutant emissions, and then breaks down this target into emission permits for each enterprise. Under this system, companies can buy and sell these permits in the market, thus flexibly adjusting their production and emission behavior. For example, if a company discovers that emissions can be reduced through technological upgrades, it can sell excess permits to other companies that need to increase emissions and gain economic benefits from it. On the contrary, if a company finds that the cost of emission reduction is too high, it can choose to purchase permits from other companies to meet emission requirements.

This market-oriented mechanism not only promotes effective control of pollutants, but also reduces overall compliance costs, allowing enterprises to make more flexible production arrangements and find the most economical ways to reduce emissions. Through license transactions, companies can share emission reduction technologies and experiences, promoting the green transformation and long-term development of the entire industry.

The transition from command and control to market-oriented

The transition from command and control to market-oriented represents an important advancement in environmental law in addressing modern environmental challenges. This transformation not only reflects the emphasis on economic efficiency, but also demonstrates trust and dependence on market forces, making environmental governance more scientific and sustainable.

Although traditional command and control strategies are directly effective, they often overlook economic efficiency and market flexibility. Command and control strategies typically establish strict laws, regulations, and standards to directly set emission limits and reduction measures for enterprises. Although this method can quickly achieve environmental goals, there are also some issues. For example, command and control strategies often lack flexibility, and enterprises must strictly follow regulations and cannot adjust them according to their own situation. In addition, command and control strategies may lead to high compliance costs, increase the burden on enterprises, and even affect economic development.

In contrast, market-oriented environmental governance strategies leverage market mechanisms to encourage enterprises to conduct cost-benefit analysis and choose the optimal emission reduction approach during the emission reduction process. By defining clear property rights and establishing an emissions trading market, market-oriented strategies can improve the overall efficiency of emissions reduction, reduce compliance costs, and promote technological innovation and environmental investment. Meanwhile, market-oriented strategies can also reflect pollution costs through price signals, prompting companies to pay more attention to environmental protection and achieve a win-win situation between economic development and environmental protection.

This shift from command and control to market-oriented not only reflects the emphasis on economic efficiency, but also demonstrates trust and dependence on market forces. Through scientific and sustainable environmental governance strategies, governments and businesses can jointly address modern environmental challenges and achieve coordinated development of environmental protection and economic development.

Data Legislation: Property Rights Definition and Market Mechanisms

As the "new oil" of the 21st century, the value and importance of data are self-evident. However, issues such as privacy breaches and data security in the process of data collection, use, and sharing are becoming increasingly severe. The application of Coase's theorem in data legislation emphasizes balancing the relationship between data utilization and individual rights protection by clarifying data property rights and constructing market mechanisms. This method not only helps to address current data governance challenges, but also provides a solid theoretical foundation for the future development of the data economy.

Personal data protection

In data legislation, Coase's theorem advocates treating personal data as an asset, and its ownership should belong to the data subject. This means that companies must obtain personal authorization to collect and use their data, otherwise they will face legal responsibility. This model not only protects personal privacy, but also incentivizes companies to adopt more transparent and responsible data processing methods through market mechanisms. The individual's right to information and choice has been respected, thereby enhancing the public's trust and participation in data processing activities.

Firstly, clarifying the ownership of data property rights can effectively protect personal privacy and reduce the risk of data leakage and abuse. In many existing data breach incidents, personal data is often collected and used without authorization, resulting in serious privacy infringement and loss of interests. By clarifying the ownership of data, it is possible to ensure the dominant position and control of data subjects in data processing activities, reduce unauthorized data collection and use, and protect personal privacy and information security.

Secondly, incentivizing enterprises to adopt transparent and responsible data processing methods through market mechanisms can improve the transparency of data processing and public trust. In this mode, enterprises need to clearly inform data subjects of their data collection, use, sharing, and storage methods, and obtain explicit authorization from data subjects. This can not only enhance the transparency of data processing, but also encourage enterprises to adopt more responsible data processing methods, reducing the risk of data leakage and abuse.

In addition, individuals' right to information and choice have been respected, thereby enhancing public trust and participation in data processing activities. In data processing activities, data subjects should have sufficient right to know and choose, be able to understand the processing methods of their data, and independently decide whether to authorize enterprises to collect and use their data. This can not only enhance the control of data subjects, but also encourage enterprises to adopt more responsible and transparent data processing methods, and increase public trust and participation in data processing activities.

Data Market and Trading Platform

In order to promote the optimal allocation of data resources, some countries and regions are exploring the establishment of data markets or trading platforms. Here, data subjects can trade their data as commodities, while enterprises need to pay corresponding fees to obtain the required data. This model not only protects the rights and interests of data subjects, but also promotes the efficient circulation and utilization of data resources, which helps to build a more fair, transparent, and active data economy ecosystem. Through such a platform, the value of data can be fully tapped, and innovation and technological progress can receive more support, thereby promoting the overall development of the economy.

On the one hand, the establishment of data markets and trading platforms can promote efficient circulation and utilization of data resources, achieving optimal allocation of data. In the data market, data subjects can trade their data as commodities, while enterprises can obtain the required data by paying corresponding fees. This model can not only promote efficient circulation and utilization of data resources, but also achieve optimal allocation of data through market mechanisms, promoting the maximization of data value and the improvement of economic benefits.

On the other hand, the establishment of data markets and trading platforms can safeguard the rights and interests of data subjects, reduce the risks of data abuse and privacy infringement. In the data market, data subjects can independently decide whether to trade their data and receive corresponding economic returns. This can not only enhance the control and benefits of data subjects, but also encourage enterprises to adopt more transparent and responsible data processing methods, reducing the risk of data abuse and privacy infringement.

In addition, the establishment of data markets and trading platforms can promote innovation and technological progress, and drive overall economic development. In the data market, enterprises can enhance the quality and competitiveness of their products and services by obtaining high-quality data resources, conducting innovation and technological research and development. This can not only promote technological progress and innovative development of enterprises, but also promote the overall development of the entire industry and economy through the sharing and utilization of data resources.

In summary, the application of Coase's theorem in environmental law and data legislation not only reflects the potential of market mechanisms in solving complex socio-economic problems, but also provides new ideas and methods for the design of legal systems. By reasonably defining property rights and constructing effective market mechanisms, not only can transaction costs be reduced, but also the optimal allocation of resources can be promoted, achieving the dual goals of environmental protection and data economy development. In the future, with the continuous improvement of data legislation and the gradual improvement of market mechanisms, we have reason to believe that a more secure, transparent, and efficient data ecosystem will bring more benefits and opportunities to society.

In future data legislation, we need to continue exploring and innovating by reasonably defining data property rights and building effective market mechanisms to address the contradictions and challenges between data utilization and personal rights protection. At the same time, we also need to strengthen international cooperation and coordination, promote global data governance and legislative processes, jointly address risks and challenges in the development of the data economy, and achieve global sharing and optimized utilization of data resources.

Future data legislation should focus on the following aspects:

1. Clarify the ownership of data property rights: Through legislation, clarify the ownership of data property rights, ensure the dominant position and control of data subjects in data processing activities, reduce unauthorized data collection and use behavior, and protect personal privacy and information security.

2. Building effective data markets and trading platforms: By establishing data markets and trading platforms, efficient circulation and utilization of data resources can be promoted, optimal allocation of data can be achieved, and the value of data can be maximized and economic benefits can be improved.

3. Strengthen data protection and security management: By improving data protection and security management systems, reduce the risk of data leakage and abuse, protect the rights and interests of data subjects, and enhance public trust and participation in data processing activities.

4. Promote international cooperation and coordination in data governance: By strengthening international cooperation and coordination, promote global data governance and legislative processes, jointly address risks and challenges in the development of the data economy, and achieve global sharing and optimized utilization of data resources.

5. Promote data innovation and technological progress: Through policy support and market incentives, promote data innovation and technological progress, enhance the quality and competitiveness of products and services, and promote the overall development of the entire industry and economy.

The application of the Coase theorem in data legislation not only provides us with a new analytical framework, but also offers new ideas and methods for solving complex problems in data governance. By reasonably defining data property rights and establishing effective market mechanisms, we can achieve a balance between data utilization and individual rights protection, promoting the sustainable development of the data economy and overall social progress.

Practical considerations and limitations of the Coase theorem

Although the Coase theorem provides an inspiring theoretical framework for environmental law and data legislation, its implementation in practical applications is not without challenges. Here are several key considerations and limitations that the Coase theorem faces in the real world:

Consideration of actual transaction costs

One of the fundamental assumptions of the Coase theorem is that transaction costs are zero, but in the real world, transaction costs often cannot be ignored. This includes the costs of finding trading partners, negotiating costs, developing contracts, and executing contracts. In environmental law and data legislation, these costs may be particularly significant, especially in complex scenarios involving multiple stakeholders and crossing borders. The high transaction costs may hinder the effective operation of market mechanisms, greatly reducing the expected effect of the Coase theorem.

For example, in environmental governance, imagine a cross-border pollution problem involving multiple countries and regions, such as river pollution or air pollution. Each country has different laws, regulations, interests, and economic conditions, which result in extremely high costs for negotiation and coordination due to these complex factors. Even if all parties hope to solve the problem through market mechanisms, the actual implementation costs may make this desire difficult to achieve. In addition, in data legislation, the collection, storage, transmission, and processing of data involve a large number of technical and legal issues, especially when it comes to cross-border data flow, which also faces differences in laws and regulations between different countries. These actual transaction costs make it difficult to fully realize the ideal assumption of Coase's theorem.

Equity imbalance and unequal market forces

The Coase theorem assumes that both parties in a transaction have equal bargaining power, but in many cases, the power dynamics between large corporations and individual users or small businesses are not balanced. In the data market, technology giants often hold huge data resources and market influence, which may put individual data subjects at a disadvantage in negotiations. Similarly, in environmental governance, large polluting enterprises may have more resources and influence than small-scale farmers or community organizations, making market mechanisms biased towards safeguarding the interests of large enterprises when solving environmental problems.

For example, in the data market, tech giants such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook have massive data resources and advanced data analysis technologies, giving them an overwhelming advantage in negotiations with individual users or small businesses. Individual users often lack sufficient negotiation skills and resources when facing these tech giants, making it difficult to protect their own rights. This unequal market force may cause the Coase theorem to deviate from its original intention in practical applications, making it impossible to achieve optimal allocation of resources.

In environmental governance, large enterprises may dominate policy-making and market transactions due to their economic strength and political influence. For example, large polluting enterprises may influence government policies through lobbying, making emission standards and environmental regulations more conducive to their own development, while neglecting the protection of the environment and public health. The unequal market forces also limit the practical effectiveness of the Coase theorem in environmental law.

Public goods and market failures

The Coase theorem is effective in dealing with externalities of private goods, but for public goods such as clean air and water, personal privacy, etc., market mechanisms may not provide sufficient protection. The characteristics of public goods are non exclusivity and non competitiveness, which means that the market cannot naturally form an effective pricing mechanism, leading to market failure. In this case, relying solely on the market mechanisms advocated by Coase's theorem may not be sufficient to solve environmental and data protection issues, and government intervention and public policy support are needed.

For example, clean air and water are typical public goods that cannot be effectively supplied and protected through market mechanisms. Although market mechanisms can partially solve pollution problems through emission trading and other means, due to the non exclusivity and non competitiveness of public goods, the market cannot regulate and manage these resources on its own. Therefore, the government needs to ensure the effective supply and protection of public goods by formulating and implementing environmental regulations, providing public services, and other means.

In terms of data protection, personal privacy is also a public good, and market mechanisms are difficult to fully protect individual privacy rights. For example, data companies may neglect the protection of personal privacy for economic benefits, leading to frequent privacy breaches and abuses. The government needs to establish strict data protection laws and regulatory policies to ensure effective protection of personal data security and privacy.

Improvement of Legal and Regulatory Framework

The effective implementation of the Coase theorem requires a sound legal and regulatory framework as support. This includes clear property rights definitions, effective contract enforcement mechanisms, a fair judicial system, and appropriate regulatory policies. In the absence of these basic conditions, market mechanisms may not be able to play their due role, thereby limiting the practical application of the Coase theorem.

For example, in environmental law, clear definition of emission rights and effective enforcement mechanisms are important prerequisites for implementing the Coase theorem. If there is a lack of clear property rights definition, enterprises and individuals may face legal uncertainty in emissions trading, leading to increased transaction costs and difficulty in effectively operating market mechanisms. Similarly, the lack of a fair judicial system and effective regulatory policies may lead to fraud, monopoly, and other issues in emissions trading, hindering the normal operation of market mechanisms.

In data legislation, a sound legal and regulatory framework is equally crucial. Clear definition of data property rights, effective data protection laws, and strict enforcement mechanisms can ensure the security and privacy of personal data and promote the healthy development of the data market. For example, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) effectively promotes fairness and transparency in the data market and enhances the level of personal data protection through clear data protection regulations and strict regulatory measures.

Social ethics and fairness considerations

While pursuing efficiency, the application of the Coase theorem also needs to consider social ethics and principles of fairness. For example, in data legislation, relying solely on market mechanisms to determine the use and exchange of personal data may exacerbate social inequality and harm the interests of vulnerable groups. Similarly, in environmental law, excessive reliance on market mechanisms may overlook the social responsibility of environmental protection, sacrificing long-term benefits for short-term economic gains.

For example, in the data market, relying solely on market mechanisms to determine the use and exchange of personal data may lead to the concentration of data resources among a few tech giants, further exacerbating social inequality. Tech giants may gain more economic benefits through big data analysis and artificial intelligence technology, while ordinary users may face risks such as privacy breaches and data abuse. Therefore, data legislation needs to be based on market mechanisms, consider social ethics and fairness principles, formulate reasonable policies, and protect the rights and interests of vulnerable groups.

In environmental law, excessive reliance on market mechanisms may lead to short-sighted behavior in environmental protection. Enterprises may neglect their long-term responsibility for environmental protection in pursuit of short-term economic benefits, leading to intensified problems of environmental pollution and resource depletion. Therefore, environmental law needs to emphasize the social responsibility of environmental protection on the basis of market mechanisms, formulate strict environmental regulations and policies, and ensure the coordinated development of economic development and environmental protection.

The practical considerations and limitations of the Coase theorem in environmental law and data legislation remind us that when applying this theory, we need to combine practical situations, comprehensively consider factors such as transaction costs, market forces, fairness principles, and legal frameworks, in order to achieve optimal resource allocation and maximize social welfare.

Conclusion and Future Directions

In summary, although the Coase theorem provides valuable theoretical perspectives for environmental law and data legislation, its practical application still faces many challenges. To fully unleash the potential of Coase's theorem, it is necessary to overcome issues such as transaction costs, equity imbalances, market failures, and the improvement of legal and regulatory frameworks.

In the field of environmental law, future legal policies should aim to reduce transaction costs, including the use of innovative means such as blockchain technology to enhance the transparency and traceability of emission trading systems, thereby improving the efficiency of market mechanisms. At the same time, policies should focus on building a fair market environment by establishing a balanced system of rules to prevent large enterprises from abusing their market advantages, ensuring that small and medium-sized enterprises and the public can enjoy equal opportunities for participation and protection of their rights and interests in environmental governance. In addition, it is crucial to improve the legal protection of public goods, which requires us to formulate stricter and forward-looking environmental regulations, combine market mechanisms with government intervention, jointly safeguard natural resources, and promote sustainable environmental protection. A sound legal and regulatory framework is indispensable, as it needs to clearly define the responsibilities and rights of all parties involved, ensuring the smooth operation and fairness of market mechanisms.

Moving towards the field of data legislation, future legal policies should focus on clarifying data property rights, establishing the dominant position and control of data subjects in the data processing process through legislative means, and building a healthy and orderly data market based on this. This not only involves establishing standardized data trading platforms to promote efficient circulation and utilization of data resources, but also requires attention to personal privacy protection and data security to ensure the healthy development of the data economy. In the context of globalization, strengthening international cooperation has become a necessary measure to promote global data governance and legislative processes, facilitate cross-border sharing and optimized allocation of data resources, and lay a solid legal foundation for the digital economy era. At the same time, the policy level should actively promote technological innovation, stimulate the vitality of data innovation through policy guidance and market incentive mechanisms, accelerate technological progress, and comprehensively enhance the international competitiveness and overall efficiency of the data economy.

Looking towards the future, the design of China's environmental and data legal policies should be at the forefront of the times, daring to integrate the wisdom of the Coase theorem with the solid foundation of traditional regulatory methods, and weave a rule of law network that pursues efficiency and defends fairness. Only in this way can we find a stable and innovative path in the complex game of environment and data protection, and build a comprehensive and efficient legal framework. Through precise property rights definition and sophisticated market mechanism construction, we can not only achieve the optimal allocation of resources, but also unleash the infinite potential of social development, leading us towards a bright future of sustainable development and illuminating every corner with the light of social welfare.