2018 Annual Report on Monopoly Agreement Enforcement Cases and Ten Year Review of Monopoly Agreement Enforcement Cases
Section 1 Summary and Introduction of Main Cases Summary Table of Case Statistics
2.Introduction to Main Cases 4
(I)Administrative Penalty Cases 4
(II)Civil and administrative litigation cases of monopoly agreement
Section 2:Law Enforcement Analysis and Comments on Monopoly Agreement Cases in 2018 33
I.Characteristics of the Relationship between Law Enforcement Entities,Law Enforcement Industries,and Law Enforcement Regions 33
II.Application of Confiscation of Illegal Income and Penalty Proportion 33
.Determination of the Elements of Monopoly Agreement and the Burden of Proof in Civil Dispute Cases 34
.Legislation of the 2018 Monopoly Agreement
Section 3 Ten Year Review of Monopoly Agreement Enforcement Cases 38
I.Statistics of Administrative Penalty Cases 38
(I)Statistics of Administrative Penalty Cases Involving Fines 38
(II)Statistics of administrative penalty cases where fines are imposed and illegal income is confiscated 95
(III)Statistics of Administrative Penalty Cases Involving Suspension and Termination of Investigations
99(IV)Statistics of Administrative Penalty Cases Exempted from Punishment 101
II.Statistics of Civil Litigation Cases 102
III.Statistics of Administrative Litigation Cases 108
IV.Equal Law Enforcement of Monopoly Agreements and the Court's Criteria for Determining Relevant Issues
"The enforcement of monopoly agreements treats all types of market entities equally and equally."one hundred and thirteen
(2)The determination of relevant issues in civil disputes over monopoly agreements is of far-reaching significance one hundred and thirteen
Section 1 Summary and Introduction of Main Cases
1、Summary of Case Statistics
Case Introduction(1)Administrative Penalty Case 1:Shaanxi 13
Family Defense Enterprise Monopoly Agreement Case[1]In March 2018,the Shaanxi Provincial Price Bureau officially announced that at the end of 2017,the Shaanxi Provincial Price Bureau issued an administrative penalty decision to 13 family defense equipment enterprises in the province in accordance with the law,imposing fines ranging from 1%to 3%of the sales of civil air defense door equipment in 2016 on the enterprises involved,totaling more than 2.2 million yuan,and ordering rectification.
With the approval of the National Defense Office,there are a total of 13 civil air defense protection equipment enterprises in Shaanxi Province with production qualifications for civil air defense doors,all of whom are parties to the case(hereinafter collectively referred to as"the parties"),and have jointly reached and implemented a price monopoly agreement.It has been found that:(1)13 parties are competitive operators and have reached a monopoly agreement to fix the sales price level of the civil air defense door.Since the second half of 2015,13 parties have gathered for many times to negotiate and reached a consensus on maintaining the information price of civil air defense doors.In April 2016,through negotiation,the"Shaanxi Civil Air Defense Protection Equipment Enterprise Self-discipline Platform"was established,and three agreements,including the"Shaanxi Civil Air Defense Protection Equipment Enterprise Self-discipline Charter","Shaanxi Civil Air Defense Protection Equipment Enterprise Self-discipline Agreement",and"2016 Self-discipline Enterprise Share",were jointly signed.The following agreements were reached:The sales price of civil air defense doors shall uniformly refer to the information price of Shaanxi civil air defense quota;2、Fixed civil air defense door installation fees,transportation fees,technical coordination fees,insurance fees,and other rates;3、Distribute the market share of each enterprise by uniformly dividing the sales market to ensure that the sales price of the civil air defense door is maintained at the information price level;4、Agreed deposit payment methods and penalties.Once the agreed low price sales are violated,the deposit will be confiscated by the self-discipline platform.(2)A monopoly agreement was implemented to fix the sales price level of civil air defense doors.On April 10th,2016,after the self-discipline charter and self-discipline agreement came into effect,13 parties paid part of the start-up expenses and 300000 yuan of deposit to the self-discipline platform,and participated in six distribution project meetings organized by the self-discipline platform.They exchanged views with participating civil air defense equipment companies on the implementation of fixed sales prices and segmented sales markets for civil air defense doors.Through the project allocation meeting,13 parties were awarded part of the project,and implemented the unified bidding behavior agreed in the"Self discipline Charter",implementing a monopoly agreement.The monopolistic behavior of relevant enterprises has led to an increase in the overall sales price of Shaanxi civil air defense doors compared to before the unified sales on the self-discipline platform.
Shaanxi Provincial Price Bureau believes that since 2016,in order to maintain the product price level and maintain their own profits,Shaanxi civil air defense protection equipment enterprises,as a special industry,have established the"Shaanxi Civil Air Defense Protection Equipment Enterprise Self-discipline Platform"through many meetings and negotiations,and jointly signed the"Shaanxi Civil Air Defense Protection Equipment Enterprise Self-discipline Charter","Shaanxi Civil Air Defense Protection Equipment Enterprise Self-discipline Agreement"Written agreements such as the"2016 Share of Self-regulated Enterprises"have been reached and implemented,including horizontal monopoly agreements to fix the sales price of civil air defense doors and split the sales market,which have eliminated and restricted relevant market competition,raised the overall sales price of the Shaanxi civil air defense door market,damaged the legitimate rights and interests of downstream real estate enterprises and end consumers,and violated the"Anti monopoly Law"on prohibiting operators with competitive relationships from reaching and implementing fixed prices Provisions of monopoly agreements such as market segmentation.At the end of 2017,13 parties were imposed administrative penalties to order them to stop their illegal activities,and the following fines were imposed:
2.Authorized by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce,the Shandong
Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce conducted a case investigation on the suspected monopoly behavior of six shopping malls including Shandong Ginza Home Appliances(hereinafter collectively referred to as"the parties")on October 14,2016,and made an administrative penalty decision on the parties involved on March 21,2018.
At the beginning of 2016,during the inspection process by the Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce,it was found that media reports such as the Qilu Evening News reported that six parties signed agreements to jointly prevent on-site merchants from going out to participate in third-party fairs,and attached great importance to them.On March 14,2016,the Jinan Administration for Industry and Commerce also reported that six parties were suspected of reaching a monopoly agreement on a boycott transaction,and the Shandong Administration for Industry and Commerce immediately conducted a preliminary verification.On July 27,2016,the preliminary verification was reported in writing to the State Administration for Industry and Commerce.On August 31,2016,the State Administration for Industry and Commerce authorized the Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce to investigate and handle the case.On October 14,2016,the case was officially filed for investigation.
Upon investigation,at the end of 2015,when the leaders of the six parties gathered for a meal,they unanimously believed that the current third-party marketing platform had seriously affected the normal operation of Jinan Home Shopping Mall.In January 2016,six parties jointly signed the"Notice to All Merchants-Notice on Prohibiting Merchants from Participating in Sales Activities Outside Various Types of Home Furnishings"(hereinafter referred to as"Notice to All Merchants"),drafted by Shandong East Asia Golden Star Home Furnishings Co.,Ltd.(one of the parties),based on the principle of standardizing business order and protecting consumer rights and interests,through consultation,The main content includes"Starting from April 1,2016,all merchants are strictly prohibited from participating in all such off-site sales activities organized by various media websites and third-party marketing platforms.Once discovered,all home shopping malls will be severely investigated and punished,and effective measures will be taken jointly until they are removed from the market.".
Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce believes that the six parties'business scope involves the wholesale and retail of furniture,building decoration materials,lamps,handicrafts,and venue leasing.They are located in the same geographical range,and have obvious substitutability in product characteristics,with a direct competitive relationship.In various media,websites,and third-party marketing platforms,many operators have overlapping business scopes with those of six parties,which are replaceable and competitive in terms of product characteristics.Therefore,among the six parties,the six parties and the same business operators in various media,websites,and third-party marketing platforms are competitive operators within the meaning of the Anti monopoly Law.In addition,the six parties and various media,websites,and third-party marketing platforms should maintain market competition order through legitimate operations,and have fair access to transactions with relevant merchants.Relevant merchants should also have the right to legally choose multiple ways to promote and sell their products.The appearance of joint restriction by six parties is to regulate business order,but in fact,it hinders normal transactions between various media,websites,third-party marketing platforms,and related merchants.At the same time,it limits the right of related merchants to freely choose trading partners,and affects the convenience of consumers'free choice of goods.Therefore,this act is essentially a monopolistic act in which six parties reach a joint exclusion and limit competition.
In summary,the Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce believes that the actions of the six parties violate the provisions of Article 13,Paragraph 1(5),of the Anti monopoly Law on"boycott transactions"and Article 7,Paragraph 1(3),of the Provisions of the Administration for Industry and Commerce on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements,"jointly restricting specific operators from engaging in transactions with operators that have a competitive relationship with them.".After the six parties reached a monopoly agreement,through administrative interviews with the Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce,the six parties rectified their illegal acts,promptly repealed the"Notice to All Merchants",and did not actually implement the monopoly agreement.Therefore,the Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce has decided to impose the following penalties on the parties in accordance with the provisions of Article 46,paragraph 1,of the Anti monopoly Law,which states that"if the monopoly agreement reached has not yet been implemented,a fine of not more than 500000 yuan may be imposed":
3.The Shandong Rizhao Self Regulatory Commission Member Unit Monopoly Agreement Case[3]was authorized by the former State Administration for Industry and Commerce.On April 5,2016,the Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce conducted a filing investigation on the suspected monopoly agreement case of the Rizhao Self Regulatory Commission Member Unit,and on May 7,2018,the administrative penalty decision was made against the 14 accounting firms(hereinafter collectively referred to as the"parties")involved in the case in Rizhao City.
After investigation,14 parties held a signing ceremony for the"Rizhao City Accounting Firm Industry Self-discipline Convention"on December 14,2010.In March 2011,the overall distribution of business income began.Each unit paid its local audit,capital verification,and other related business income to a unified dedicated bank account,and then redistributed the income of each unit according to the indicators agreed in advance.In May 2012,all member units of the Rizhao Self Discipline Committee jointly discussed and reached the"Juxian County Business Overall Allocation Method",which agreed that three member units would undertake the relevant business of Rizhao Juxian County,while member units outside Juxian County would handle the business of Juxian County,and 70%of the overall business amount would be allocated by the member units of Juxian County through agreement.After the three member units have paid the relevant business income from Juxian County,Rizhao,to the special account of the Rizhao Self-discipline Committee,only these three member units will be separately allocated according to the agreed proportion in advance.After June 2014,all member units stopped paying the income pooling fund.In July 2014,three member units in Juxian County negotiated and refunded the income pooling fund during the overall allocation period.From May to July 2016,11 member units of the Rizhao Self-discipline Committee,excluding 3 in Juxian County,negotiated and refunded the income pooling fund during the overall allocation period.
Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce believes that under normal market competition,the income earned by operators should be directly proportional to their business performance,which is the direct motivation for operators to participate in market competition,and the relevant markets can therefore develop in an orderly manner.As equal market operating entities,14 parties should have a fair competition relationship in relevant businesses,and jointly reach and implement the"Implementation Measures for Overall Distribution of Business Income,""Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Business Inspection,Overall Planning,and Distribution,"and"Juxian County Business Overall Distribution Measures,"integrating relevant income and re dividing it based on indicators such as market share in previous years,although it is argued that its original intention is to promote industry self-discipline,However,in essence,the income of operators who have expanded their market share through normal competition is divided among other operators with competitive relationships,directly resulting in more work without more,while less work can be compensated.This obviously unfair approach not only fails to promote industry self-discipline,but also harms the interests of operators in the industry who obtain development results through normal competition,fails to achieve the ultimate goal of fair competition in the industry,weakens the enthusiasm of operators to participate in market competition,destroys the fair competition order of relevant industries,and is not conducive to improving economic operation efficiency and stimulating the vitality of market entities.
Juxian County,Rizhao City,is a part of the administrative jurisdiction of Rizhao City,and operators have the right to compete on an equal footing in carrying out relevant businesses in this area.However,14 parties reached a"Juxian County Business Overall Allocation Method"through mutual agreement,dividing Juxian County into a separate regional market,and artificially dividing the member units of the Self-discipline Committee into local Juxian County and external Juxian County.It is agreed that only three local member units in Juxian County will independently coordinate and allocate relevant business within the Juxian County area,while member units outside Juxian County will handle Juxian County business,and 70%of the overall business amount will be allocated by Juxian County member units through agreement.The above practices hinder the motivation and enthusiasm of operators outside the region to participate in competitive activities in the region,and have typical characteristics of behaviors prohibited by the Anti monopoly Law.In summary,the Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce believes that the actions of the parties are suspected of violating the relevant provisions of Article 13,Paragraph 1,of the Anti monopoly Law:"Prohibiting operators with competitive relationships from entering into the following monopoly agreements:(3)Splitting the sales market or raw material procurement market",which constitutes an act of splitting the sales market.As the chairman unit,Rizhao Fangda Certified Public Accountants Co.,Ltd.undertakes leadership responsibilities such as convening and presiding over meetings of the self-discipline committee and coordinating and communicating with member units in the Rizhao self-discipline committee.Other member units,as participants in the overall distribution of business income,assume common responsibilities.
Shandong Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce has imposed administrative penalties on 13 members of the Rizhao Self-discipline Committee(the Rizhao Branch of Xinlianyi Certified Public Accountants Co.,Ltd.was cancelled on December 29,2016),ordering them to stop their illegal activities,and concurrently imposing the following fines:
4.The Monopoly Agreement Case of Four Tow Companies in Shenzhen[4]:Since November 2017,the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration has investigated four tug companies in Shenzhen(Shenzhen Yantian Tug Co.,Ltd.,Shenzhen Lianda Tug Co.,Ltd.,Shenzhen Chiwan Tug Co.,Ltd.,Shenzhen Dachanwan Tug Co.,Ltd.,hereinafter collectively referred to as"the parties")for allegedly concluding and implementing price monopoly agreements.
According to the survey,at least since 2010,the four parties have held regular or irregular meetings to communicate the overall trend of tugboat fees and maintain a basically consistent overall price trend;On the other hand,communicate on the issue of tugboat fees for individual shipping companies,and maintain a basically consistent negotiation strategy.The specific performance is as follows:(1)There is a competitive relationship between the four parties:the business licenses of the four parties clearly specify the permitted business areas,which are respectively subordinate to different port areas,and do not overlap with each other.However,due to the relatively close distance between Yantian Port Area in the east of Shenzhen Port and Shekou Port Area in the west,Chiwan Port Area,and Dachanwan Port Area,there is relatively fierce market competition among different port areas.Tug fees are included in the overall cost incurred by the shipping company at the port as part of the shipping company's port fees.Therefore,competition between different port areas will be transmitted to their subordinate tugboat companies,resulting in a competitive relationship between tugboat companies.(2)Communication between the four parties on tugboat charges has been conducted to maintain a basically consistent pricing behavior:The survey shows that the four parties hold regular or irregular meetings every year to communicate on tugboat charges and other matters,in order to maintain a consistent overall trend in the level of charges.From the perspective of the level of tugboat fees charged by the four parties,since 2010,the level of fees charged by the four parties and other tugboat companies in the Shenzhen Port Area has shown a steady upward trend,with a basically consistent time node and range of changes,indicating a consistent price behavior.In addition,when merger and other matters occur among some shipping companies,the four parties communicate with other tugboat companies on the issue of tugboat rates and charges to maintain a basically consistent negotiation strategy.
The State Market Supervision and Administration has determined that communication between the four parties on the issue of tugboat fees,based on which the price behavior is basically consistent,limits competition among tugboat companies,and is an act of reaching and implementing a"fixed or changed commodity price"monopoly agreement.Considering that the four parties have communicated on the overall price trend,there is less involvement in the tugboat rates of specific shipping companies;Due to factors such as a small proportion of tugboat fees in port fees and limited damage to competition between ports,administrative penalties were imposed on the four parties on June 11,2018 to order them to stop their illegal activities,and the following fines were imposed:
5.Monopoly Agreement between Two Tally Companies in Shenzhen[5]The State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration investigated the behavior of two tally companies in Shenzhen(Shenzhen Zhongli Shipping Tally Co.,Ltd.and Shenzhen Zhonglian Tally Co.,Ltd.,hereinafter collectively referred to as"the parties")in reaching and implementing monopoly agreements in November 2017.
Upon investigation,it is found that(1)there is a competitive relationship between the parties:both parties are engaged in tallying business in the western port area of Shenzhen Port.From the perspective of equity structure,although China Merchants Logistics Group Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"China Merchants Logistics")holds 50%of the respective shares of the parties after 2013,China Merchants Logistics is a relatively controlling shareholder for Shenzhen Zhongli Ocean Shipping Tally Co.,Ltd.,with the remaining two shareholders,China Ocean Shipping Tally Corporation and China Shenzhen Ocean Shipping Agency Co.,Ltd.,holding 29%and 21%of the respective shares;For Shenzhen Zhonglian Tally Co.,Ltd.,China Merchants Logistics and Zhonglian Tally Co.,Ltd.each hold 50%of the shares,and China Merchants Logistics does not have a relatively controlling position.From the perspective of actual business management,the two parties independently carry out production and operation.After the new tally company entered the Western Port Area of Shenzhen Port in August 2016,communication and coordination between the two parties ceased and normal market competition began.Therefore,the two parties belong to competitive operators.(2)The two parties divided the market share and jointly pushed up the tallying price in the western port area of Shenzhen Port:From May 2013 to August 2016,the two parties divided the market share in the western port area of Shenzhen Port into five parts,and regularly communicated the tallying rate to jointly push up the tallying market price.The specific performance is as follows:(1)The two parties have reached and implemented an agreement to divide market share.In May 2013,the two parties reached an agreement on the division of the tally market in the western port area of Shenzhen Port during the"Five Year Plan"period.After that,the above agreement was implemented:on the one hand,customers were transferred through price coordination.After 2013,the two parties have repeatedly adopted price coordination methods,with Shenzhen Zhongli Shipping Tally Co.,Ltd.offering higher price conditions to customers,prompting them to choose the tallying service of Shenzhen Zhonglian Tally Co.,Ltd.to achieve the purpose of transferring customers.According to the email,at least 8 customers have been transferred through communication and coordination.On the other hand,the two parties directly transfer the difference in tallying income.For the tallying revenue exceeding the"Five Five Year Plan",Shenzhen Zhongli Shipping Tally Co.,Ltd.signed a tallying market share transfer agreement with Shenzhen Zhonglian Tally Co.,Ltd.four times on December 29,2013,December 30,2014,July 16,2015,and December 30,2015,respectively,to transfer the part of the revenue exceeding 50%of the market share to Shenzhen Zhonglian Tally Co.,Ltd.,with a total transfer amount of 9.724 million yuan.(2)The two parties jointly pushed up the tally price in the western port area of Shenzhen Port.Since 2013,the two parties have repeatedly communicated with each other about the tally price through email and other means,signed a tally contract with customers that has increased prices year by year,and worked hard to push the tally price to the level of 12 yuan per standard box.From the perspective of actual implementation prices,the tally prices of both parties have been increasing year by year since 2013.By 2016,the tally prices for all customers of Shenzhen Zhongli Shipping tally Co.,Ltd.had basically increased to the level of 12 yuan per standard box;Shenzhen Zhonglian Tally Co.,Ltd.also raised the tally price of most customers to around 12 yuan per standard box.
The two parties raised the following defense reasons:According to the relevant documents of the former Ministry of Communications,the Ministry of Transport,and the National Development and Reform Commission,the market adjusted price for tallying service fees is implemented.Therefore,before September 15,2017,government guidance prices will be implemented for tally service fees.The actions of the two parties are aimed at better implementing the unified regulations of the former Ministry of Communications and raising the tally price to the level of the government's guidance price.There may be some unreasonable aspects in the form,but they do not violate the relevant provisions of the Anti monopoly Law.One of the parties,Shenzhen Zhongli Shipping Tally Co.,Ltd.,also proposed another defense reason:it does not have a competitive relationship with Shenzhen Zhonglian Tally Co.,Ltd.On the one hand,China Merchants Logistics is a shareholder of both companies,and both hold 50%of the shares;On the other hand,some indirect shareholders of the two companies are the same.Therefore,any agreement signed between it and Shenzhen Zhonglian tally company does not constitute a monopoly agreement.
The State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration believes that the defense opinions of the two parties are not tenable.The reasons are as follows:(1)Regardless of whether the tallying price is a government guided price or a market regulated price,operators should independently establish charging standards based on their own production and operating costs and market supply and demand conditions in accordance with the principles of fairness,legality,and good faith.The practice of two parties communicating with each other and jointly pushing up the prices in the tally market violates the relevant requirements for independent pricing by operators,and excludes and restricts market competition.(2)There is a competitive relationship between the two parties.On the one hand,from the perspective of national policy requirements,it is clear that"in order to establish a moderate competition mechanism in the tally market,two tally companies in each port cannot be controlled and operated by identical investment entities",as the basic principle for establishing a second foreign shipping tally company.Before August 2016,only two parties were engaged in production and operation in the Western Port Area of Shenzhen Port,and the two parties should conduct fair competition in accordance with the above requirements.On the other hand,from the perspective of actual operation,after the new tally company entered the Western Port Area of Shenzhen Port in August 2016,the two parties stopped dividing the market and coordinating prices,and have already engaged in normal market competition.
The State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration has determined that the two parties,as operators with competitive relationships,transferred customers through price coordination from May 2013 to August 2016,and transferred part of the revenue exceeding the market division every year,eliminating and limiting competition between the two parties,which is an act of concluding and implementing a"split sales market"monopoly agreement;"The exchange of tallying price information between the two parties,which jointly drives up the tallying market price in the western port area of Shenzhen Port,limits price competition between the two parties,and is an act of reaching and implementing a monopoly agreement on"fixing or changing commodity prices."".In consideration of the fact that the two parties have voluntarily stopped their illegal activities in August 2016,a decision was made to impose administrative penalties on the two parties on July 9,2018 in accordance with the law.The specific penalties are as follows:
6.The National Development and Reform Commission has investigated,in accordance with the law,the behavior of PetroChina Daqing Oilfield Company Natural Gas Branch and PetroChina Natural Gas Sales Daqing Branch(hereinafter collectively referred to as"the parties")entering into and implementing price monopoly agreements with counterparties.
After investigation,the two parties reached and implemented a monopoly agreement limiting the minimum price for resale of CNG natural gas with 13 downstream CNG(compressed natural gas)mother stations in Harbin,Qiqihar,and Daqing regions(hereinafter referred to as"Harbin Daqi region"),in violation of the relevant provisions of Article 14 of the Anti monopoly Law,limiting the minimum price for resale of CNG natural gas by downstream CNG mother stations.The specific performance is as follows:(1)Hold a meeting to agree on the minimum resale price.On August 11 and August 25,2016,the relevant principals of the two parties convened a meeting of 13 CNG parent stations,requiring each CNG parent station to resell to the sub station at a price of no less than 2.25 yuan/cubic meter,and implemented uniformly from September 1,2016.Previously,each CNG parent station independently determined the resale price to its sub stations based on market conditions,with the price level ranging from 1.76 yuan/cubic meter to 2.3 yuan/cubic meter,but mainly concentrated around 2.00 yuan/cubic meter.(2)Organize the signing of"Harbin Daqi CNG Market Sales Agreement".On August 29,2016,the two parties organized 13 downstream CNG parent stations to jointly sign the"Kazakhstan Daqi CNG Market Sales Agreement",which clearly stipulates that from September 1,2016,the CNG parent station shall sell CNG natural gas at a minimum sales price of 2.25 yuan/cubic meter,and any parent station shall not be lower than the minimum sales price.(3)Issue a"Supplementary Notice"to promote the implementation of the minimum price limit.On September 2,2016,the two parties issued a Supplementary Notice on the Implementation of the"Harbin Daqi CNG Market Sales Agreement"to 13 CNG parent stations,requiring that sales be made strictly in accordance with the agreed minimum price,and threatening to stop gas supply if they refuse to implement it.
At the same time,under the supervision of both parties,the downstream CNG parent station implemented a price monopoly agreement.Performance:(1)The downstream CNG parent station has implemented a minimum price limit.Upon investigation,from September 1,2016,the CNG parent station in Harbin Daqi region will be sold at the minimum price of 2.25 yuan/cubic meter.(2)CNG parent stations are required to regularly report sales prices and other data based on the implementation of the minimum price limit.After the signing of the"Harbin Daqi CNG Market Sales Agreement",the two parties require the CNG parent station to regularly report the sales target,sales volume,and sales unit price,and track the implementation of the minimum sales limit;On April 19,2017,the"Parent Station Customer Questionnaire"and"Parent Station Customer Questionnaire"were distributed to the CNG parent station,and a questionnaire survey was conducted on the"export sales situation"and"floor price implementation situation"after the signing of the"Hadaqi CNG Market Sales Agreement",further tracking and supervising the implementation of price limits.(3)Establish a monitoring team to monitor the implementation of the minimum price limit for CNG parent stations,and threaten those who refuse to implement the plan by cutting back,limiting gas,or even stopping gas.In order to supervise the price implementation of downstream CNG parent stations,the two parties organized a"supervision team"to focus on supervising the price implementation of each CNG parent station through on-site inspection.
The above-mentioned actions of the two parties constitute an illegal act of concluding and implementing a monopoly agreement on"limiting the minimum price for resale of goods to third parties",which seriously excludes and restricts market competition for natural gas products,harms the legitimate rights and interests of end customers and consumers,and undermines a fair market environment.Considering that the two parties were able to actively cooperate in the investigation process,truthfully state relevant facts,promptly conduct self-inspection and self correction,and revoked the Hadaqi CNG Market Sales Agreement and conducted comprehensive rectification.On January 26,2018,the National Development and Reform Commission,in accordance with the law,imposed administrative penalties on the two parties to conclude and implement a monopoly agreement,ordering them to stop their illegal activities,and concurrently imposed the following fines:
7.According to reports from the public and preliminary investigation and verification by the Administration for Industry and Commerce of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and the Qinzhou Municipal Administration for Industry and Commerce,it is found that Qinzhou Fengshun Fireworks and Fireworks Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Fengshun Company")and Qinzhou Zhongtian Fireworks and Fireworks Sales Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Zhongtian Company")Qinzhou City Flying Fireworks Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Flying Company")(hereinafter referred to as"the parties")has signed the"Qinnan District Fireworks and Fireworks Wholesale Market Operation and Management Agreement",which is suspected of reaching a monopoly agreement and violating the relevant provisions of the"Anti monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China".Authorized by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce,on January 5,2015,the Administration for Industry and Commerce of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region filed a case investigation into the alleged monopoly of the party in the fireworks and firecrackers market in Qinnan District,Qinzhou City.
According to the investigation,Qinnan District of Qinzhou City is composed of 12 towns and 4 streets,with 3 fireworks and firecrackers wholesale enterprises being the three parties involved in this case.On April 12,2012,the Qinzhou Municipal Bureau of Work Safety Supervision and Administration issued a notice specifying:First,it is required that fireworks and firecrackers trading(wholesale)enterprises in various counties(districts)can only engage in business activities within their jurisdiction and cannot operate across jurisdictions;Second,fireworks and firecrackers retail outlets must purchase fireworks and firecrackers from prescribed fireworks and firecrackers business(wholesale)enterprises,and cannot purchase fireworks and firecrackers from other channels.In order to ensure their respective interests and in accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned documents,the three parties,led by Zhongtian Company,organized Fengshun Company and Flying Company to discuss the division and management of fireworks and firecrackers business households in the streets and towns under the jurisdiction of Qinnan District,Qinzhou City by sales areas,and reached an agreement.On April 20,2014,they signed the"Qinnan District Fireworks and Firecrackers Wholesale Market Operation and Management Agreement"(hereinafter referred to as the"Management Agreement").The Management Agreement stipulates the"regional division,execution time,responsibilities,rights,obligations,and liabilities for breach of contract"of the three fireworks and firecrackers wholesale companies in Qinnan District,and the main contents are as follows:(1)Division of operation and management areas.Divide the towns and townships in Qinnan District into three regions,with the three parties responsible for selling different towns and streets;(2)Divide the execution time of regional operation management.From May 15,2014 to May 15,2017,after the expiration of the contract,the three parties will discuss the division of regional operations;(3)The three parties are not allowed to engage in private firearms and illegal products,and the fireworks and firecrackers products operated by both parties must be affixed with the dealer's anti-counterfeit label,and the anti-counterfeit label must be submitted to the Safety Supervision Bureau for filing for inspection by law enforcement departments;(4)The three parties must do a good job in purchasing and selling business,product distribution,tracking services,and other work in their respective regions.Strictly abide by the provisions of the agreement on division of regional operations and management,and do not operate across regions.It is strictly prohibited to provide retail operators with services for handling various licenses beyond regions;(5)Liability for breach of contract:1.If it is found that the opposite party sells fireworks and firecrackers to retail operators,it shall be considered as illegal operation of private firearms and punished with a penalty for breach of contract.2."None of the three parties is able to provide all the necessary procedures for handling the relevant certificates and licenses for operating fireworks and firecrackers to the retail operators within the other party's area.If verified,the observant party has the right to claim liquidated damages from the breaching party.".
After the signing of the Management Agreement,(1)Fengshun Company produced the company's anti-counterfeit label and informed the retail operators of fireworks and firecrackers in the area according to the area specified in the Management Agreement from May to December 2014,requiring them to purchase fireworks and firecrackers from their sources and uniformly affix their anti-counterfeit labels to the fireworks and firecrackers that had not been sold out by each operator.Goods that do not have their anti-counterfeiting labels affixed shall be confiscated as"private guns"to ensure the implementation of the provisions on wholesale supply of fragmented products.(2)In 2014,the flight company customized the company's anti-counterfeiting label,and in 2014,it informed the retail operators of fireworks and firecrackers in the area according to the area specified in the Management Agreement,requiring them to purchase fireworks and firecrackers products from the area,and uniformly affix their anti-counterfeiting labels to the previously unsold fireworks and firecrackers products of each operator.Goods that do not have their anti-counterfeiting labels affixed shall be confiscated as"private guns"to ensure the implementation of the provisions on wholesale supply of fragmented products.(3)Zhongtian Company customized the company's anti-counterfeit label,and affixed the company's anti-counterfeit label to the products sold by the company wholesale.During 2014,according to the area designated in the Management Agreement,it informed the retail operators of fireworks and firecrackers in the area,requiring them to purchase fireworks and firecrackers from their sources,and uniformly affixed their anti-counterfeit labels to the fireworks and firecrackers products that had not been sold out by each operator previously.Goods that do not have their anti-counterfeiting labels affixed shall be confiscated as"private guns"to ensure the implementation of the provisions on wholesale supply of fragmented products.
The three parties require retailers applying for the"fireworks and firecrackers retail license"to pay a certain amount of purchase price in advance."Those who fail to pay the purchase price in accordance with the specified amount,or do not apply for a"fireworks and firecrackers retail license,"or impose sanctions by restricting the quantity of supplies.".Some retailers are afraid that they will not be able to obtain sufficient supply during the peak sales season,so they are forced to pay the purchase price in advance.During the peak sales season,some retailers with less advance payment for orders cannot purchase from other wholesalers,even if the designated supplier does not have a marketable product to choose from.The actions of the three parties have resulted in fireworks and firecrackers retailers in the designated area being able to purchase only from the designated sole fireworks and firecrackers wholesale enterprise,depriving them of their independent choice in terms of suppliers,business varieties,commodity prices,etc.
The Administration for Industry and Commerce of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region believes that according to the"Regulations on the Safety Management of Fireworks and Firecrackers",the law does not prohibit fireworks and firecrackers wholesale enterprises from supplying goods to retailers across administrative regions,nor does it stipulate that fireworks and firecrackers retailers can only purchase fireworks and firecrackers from wholesale enterprises within their administrative regions.Accordingly,the three parties,as the three fireworks and firecrackers wholesale enterprises in Qinnan District,belong to independent legal entities that have a horizontal competitive relationship according to law.They should have fully and orderly competed in accordance with the rules of the market economy and the Regulations on the Safety Management of Fireworks and Firecrackers,but they actively organized and implemented the division of the wholesale sales market and signed the Management Agreement based on the administrative restrictions of the safety supervision department.This has led to the formation of an interest alliance among the three parties that originally had a competitive relationship in Qinnan District,forming a dependence on the planned quota,losing the motivation and enthusiasm to participate in the competition,making it impossible for operators and consumers in the fireworks and firecrackers retail industry to enjoy the economic benefits brought about by full competition in the wholesale sector,and objectively meeting the business purpose of the three parties to obtain high monopoly profits through the division of the wholesale sales market.Therefore,the"Management Agreement"signed and implemented between the parties belongs to the monopoly agreement of"dividing the sales market"prohibited by Article 13,Paragraph 1(3)of the Anti monopoly Law.
The Administration for Industry and Commerce of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region held that on July 25,2018,it imposed administrative penalties on the three parties to order them to stop their illegal acts,and imposed the following fines:
8.In December 2016,Beihai Motor Vehicle Driver Training Association(hereinafter referred to as"Beihai Motor Vehicle Driver Training Association")needed to introduce the timekeeping training system of Guangxi Yunjia Network Technology Co.,Ltd.in the name of backward technology of the original timekeeping training system,to collect fees related to registration management fees and training fees for C1 driving training,Several times,11 competitive driving training institutions(hereinafter referred to as"driving training institutions")in Beihai City have been organized to reach an agreement on the price increase of C1 driving training through WeChat groups,convening meetings,oral negotiations,and other methods,and reached a price monopoly agreement:for students who signed up for C1 driving training after January 20,2017,the fee standard for registration management fees should be uniformly adjusted to not less than 2000 yuan per person.On January 16,2017,through WeChat official account,the information was released that:after being studied and approved by Beihai Motor Vehicle Driver Training Association,from January 20,2017,the new mode of time charging and paying after training was uniformly implemented in Beihai,and the registration fee of 2000 yuan/person was uniformly adjusted.Due to the unified price increase of the organization and member units of the Beihai Driving Training Association,the number of applicants for C1 driving training at 11 driving training institutions in the city doubled during January 17-19,2017,and during the Spring Festival,which also caused negative repercussions in society.
Since January 20,2017,11 driving training institutions have respectively adjusted the charging standard for C1 driving training registration management fees to 1950-2050 yuan per person,and implemented collusive price increases.Their price increases are consistent,and there are monopolistic acts of collaborative price increases,in violation of the provisions of Article 13,Paragraph 1(1)of the Anti monopoly Law that prohibit competitive operators from entering into fixed or changed commodity price monopoly agreements,It constitutes a monopolistic agreement with competitive operators to reach and implement fixed or changed commodity prices,which limits market competition,harms the interests of consumers,and undermines the market environment for fair competition.
After more than a year and a half of anti monopoly law enforcement investigations,the Price Bureau of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region imposed administrative penalties on the Beihai Motor Vehicle Driver Training Association and 11 competitive motor vehicle driver training institutions in Beihai City in July 2018 for reaching and implementing price monopoly agreements on matters such as C1 motor vehicle driver training registration management fee increases,and the following penalties were imposed:
9.The Monopoly Agreement between Two River Sand Companies in Guangdong Province[9]Guangdong Development and Reform Commission confirmed the following facts through investigation:Huizhou Dongjiang River Sand Operation Co.,Ltd.(one of the parties)sent a letter on negotiating the sales price of Dongjiang Huizhou River Sand to Huizhou Huicheng Xinrong River Sand Mining and Operation Co.,Ltd.(one of the parties)on June 17,2015,It is recommended that Huizhou Huicheng Xinrong River Sand Mining and Operation Co.,Ltd.set the sales price of river sand at the Xinrong sand field adjacent to its Tantou sand field(sales price:75 yuan/m3)to 67 yuan/m3.According to the Report on Adjusting the Sales Price of River Sand submitted by Huizhou Huicheng District Xinrong River Sand Mining and Operation Co.,Ltd.to the Huicheng District River Sand Mining Leading Group on December 7,2015,Huizhou Huicheng District Xinrong River Sand Mining and Operation Co.,Ltd.adjusted the price in accordance with the price adjustment proposal of Huizhou Dongjiang River Sand Operation Co.,Ltd,After the price adjustment,the average sales price of river sand for the entire bid section of Huizhou Huicheng Xinrong River Sand Mining and Operation Co.,Ltd.reached 67 yuan/m3.
The Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission believes that the parties'coordinated adjustment of river sand prices,the conclusion and implementation of price monopoly agreements,and the fixing and disguised fixing of river sand sales prices have limited sufficient competition in the Huizhou river sand market,raised the price level,and harmed the legitimate interests of river sand demanders,"Violation of Article 13 of the Anti monopoly Law,which prohibits competitive operators from entering into the following monopoly agreements:(1)fixing or changing commodity prices,"and Article 17 of the Anti Price Monopoly Provisions,which prohibits competitive operators from entering into the following price monopoly agreements:(1)fixing or changing the price level of goods and services(hereinafter collectively referred to as commodities).".
On August 14,2018,the Development and Reform Commission of Guangdong Province imposed an administrative penalty on the party concerned to order it to stop the illegal act,and imposed the following fines:
10.In May 2017,according to reports from the public,the Henan Administration for Industry and Commerce issued a lawsuit against Puyang Tongda Construction Engineering Testing Service Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Tongda Company"),Henan Jianyuan Engineering Quality Testing Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Jianyuan Company")Henan Shengda Construction Engineering Testing Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Shengda Company")(hereinafter referred to as the three companies collectively referred to as"the parties")was suspected of entering into and implementing monopolistic acts and conducted inspections.In July 2017,it reported the inspection results to the former State Administration for Industry and Commerce.In August 2017,with the authorization of the former State Administration for Industry and Commerce for investigation and processing,the Henan Administration for Industry and Commerce filed a case investigation against three parties on October 9,2017.
Upon investigation,on March 6,2015,initiated by Tongda Company,the three parties signed the"Strategic Cooperation Agreement for Testing Units in Puyang City"on the grounds of"promoting the development of testing industry in Puyang City,standardizing testing behavior,and improving testing efficiency."According to the agreement,the three parties jointly funded the establishment of the"Puyang Construction Project Quality Testing Service Hall"to focus on testing business operations.From March 2015 to October 2017,the three parties committed the following major monopolistic acts:(1)Unified operation.The three parties have set up business acceptance counters in the"Puyang City Construction Project Quality Inspection Service Hall",but the specific business will be jointly designated by the manager.According to the distribution principles agreed in the agreement,the testing business will be distributed as a whole,and the assigned testing business will be completed according to a unified process.No separate form of construction project quality testing business will be conducted externally.(2)Unified management."The system and process information such as"Testing and Entrustment Process Flow Chart","Sample Management System","Entrustment Management System","Hall Service Management System","Report Management System","Charge Management System",and"Testing Price"shall be uniformly displayed in the"Service Hall",and unified processes and systems shall be implemented.".(3)Uniform charge.A charging window is set up in the service hall,where the three parties arrange personnel to charge according to a unified charging price,and the collected testing fees are uniformly managed.(4)Unified distribution.The three parties shall allocate testing service fees in accordance with the agreed proportion.
The aforementioned actions of the three parties have the following harmful consequences:(1)Destroying the competitive order of the Puyang urban construction project quality testing market.Each party is an independent and competitive entity in the construction project quality testing market,and should continuously improve the testing and service levels through fair competition to provide high-quality and efficient testing services for construction projects.However,after the three parties reached and implemented a monopoly agreement,the competitive relationship between them was eliminated,and the competitive order in the construction project quality testing market in Puyang City was disrupted.(2)Harming the legitimate interests of relevant construction engineering enterprises.The three parties reached and implemented a monopoly agreement,limiting the power of construction engineering enterprises to choose transaction methods such as sample collection and delivery methods,testing prices,and testing times.They can only passively accept fixed transaction methods that are beneficial to the testing party,damaging the legitimate interests of relevant construction engineering enterprises.(3)Harming the interests of relevant people and the public.The three parties reached and implemented a monopoly agreement,increasing the costs of sample collection and delivery,labor,and testing in the construction project quality testing process,and damaging the interests of the relevant people and the public.
Henan Administration for Industry and Commerce believes that the above actions of the three parties violate the provisions of"segmentation of the sales market or raw material market"prohibited by Article 13,Paragraph 1(3)of the Anti monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China,and conclude and implement a monopoly agreement and implement a monopoly agreement.On October 22,2018,the three parties were imposed administrative penalties to order them to stop their illegal activities,and the following fines were imposed:
11.According to laws and regulations such as the"Anti monopoly Law",the Tianjin Development and Reform Commission has,since June 2018,issued a lawsuit against Tianjin Zhenhua Haijing Logistics Co.,Ltd.,Sinotrans(Tianjin)Storage and Transportation Co.,Ltd.,Shengshi Logistics(Tianjin)Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Zhenhua International Logistics and Transportation Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Keyun International Logistics Group Co.,Ltd Tianjin Jinshi Minmetals International Logistics Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Boda Group Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Malenda Logistics Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Shengshi Container Co.,Ltd.,Changhua International Logistics(Tianjin)Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Sinotrans Container Development Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Zhongchuang Haitong Logistics Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Chaohua Zhongdian Logistics Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Dihai Container Yard Co.,Ltd A total of 17 Tianjin port yard companies(hereinafter collectively referred to as"the parties"),including Tianjin Xingang Branch of China Storage Development Co.,Ltd.,Tianjin Binhai COSCO Container Logistics Co.,Ltd.,and Tianjin Foreign Logistics Co.,Ltd.,have been investigated for allegedly concluding and implementing price monopoly agreements.
After investigation:(1)17 parties belong to the same storage yard companies in Tianjin Port Area,and 17 parties have a competitive relationship in the storage yard service market of Tianjin Port.Firstly,in terms of business scope,the business license of the storage yard company involved in the case indicates that the business scope includes"container storage,handling,and loading/unloading"and other services;Secondly,in terms of commodity functions,the services provided by the involved yard company to the opposite party include container storage,handling,lifting,and other related services;Thirdly,in terms of the nature of the industry,the companies involved in the case are all container yard operators,and relevant business projects must be approved by the industry competent department before they can operate.Fourthly,in terms of regional market,the business premises of the companies involved in the case are all located in the Tianjin Port Area,with relatively close spatial distance and relatively fierce competition.(2)All 17 parties have participated in concluding and implementing monopoly agreements that fix or change the price of services.It has been verified that since 2010,17 parties have fixed the prices of comprehensive surcharges and unloading fees through signing proposals,gathering and dining,email communication,telephone contact,and other forms.On December 24,2010,April 8,2011,March 29,2012,and December 20,2012,17 parties reached a proposal for a fixed comprehensive surcharge and unloading fee with the involved storage yard.Since then,17 parties have formed a relatively stable price alliance and continued to work together to adjust the specific prices of the above fees.
The Tianjin Development and Reform Commission believes that 17 parties,as operators with competitive relationships,have fixed or changed the comprehensive surcharges and unloading fees that are subject to market regulation in accordance with the law in the form of agreements,thereby eliminating and restricting competition in the Tianjin port yard service market,and violating the provisions of Article 13,paragraph 1(a),of the Anti monopoly Law,It is an illegal act of a competitive operator to enter into and implement a"fixed or changed commodity price monopoly agreement".On November 16,2018,16 parties other than Tianjin Foreign Logistics Co.,Ltd.were imposed administrative penalties to order them to stop their illegal activities,and the following fines were imposed:
12.The Monopoly Agreement Case of Three Iced Acetic Acid API Manufacturing Enterprises[12]According to laws and regulations such as the"Anti monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China",the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration investigated the behavior of Taishan Xinning Pharmaceutical Co.,Ltd.,Sichuan Jinshan Pharmaceutical Co.,Ltd.,and Chengdu Huayi Pharmaceutical Accessory Manufacturing Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter collectively referred to as"the parties")in reaching and implementing a price monopoly agreement.After investigation:(1)The three parties are competitive operators.The main reason is that the three parties are three independent market entities,all producing and selling raw materials of glacial acetic acid,which are mainly used for the production of hemodialysis concentrate,with obvious substitutability,forming a direct competitive relationship.(2)The three parties reached a price monopoly agreement.The three parties reached a monopoly agreement to increase the sales price of raw materials for glacial acetic acid through telephone communication,face-to-face communication,and meetings.In October 2017,the three parties conducted a telephone communication to exchange market conditions of glacial acetic acid APIs,exchange production and sales information,propose to jointly increase the price of glacial acetic acid APIs,and all expressed their willingness to increase the price.In November 2017,during the China International Pharmaceutical Intermediates Packaging Equipment Fair(Xiamen),the three parties further discussed the issue of increasing the price of raw materials for glacial acetic acid.In December 2017,the three parties exchanged views on the above discussion and the joint increase in the sales price of glacial acetic acid,and all three parties recognized the joint increase in price.In January 2018,the three parties held a meeting in Nanchang to further discuss the issue of increasing the price of raw materials for glacial acetic acid.After the above communication and negotiation,the three parties reached a monopoly agreement to increase the sales price of glacial acetic acid APIs.They agreed to uniformly increase the sales price of glacial acetic acid APIs from March 1,2018,with a price of 28 yuan to 28.5 yuan/kg for downstream hemodialysis plants and 33 yuan/kg for pharmaceutical enterprises.As a competitive operator,the parties exchange price information and form a willingness to uniformly increase prices,which constitutes an illegal act of concluding a price monopoly agreement with a competitive operator.(3)The three parties have implemented the above-mentioned price monopoly agreement.The three parties implemented the above price monopoly agreement in the process of establishing the sales price of glacial acetic acid API and the actual sales process.Before the monopoly agreement was reached,the average price of glacial acetic acid sold by the three parties was 9.3 yuan/kg.After reaching a monopoly agreement,the three parties informed downstream customers of the price increase through issuing price adjustment letters,oral notices,and other methods.The price for hemodialysis plants rose to 28 yuan/kg,and the price for pharmaceutical companies rose to 33 yuan/kg.The adjusted sales price is consistent with the monopoly agreement.During the actual sales process,the three parties sold at the above prices and strictly implemented the monopoly agreement.
The State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration believes that the above-mentioned actions of the three parties are illegal acts of reaching and implementing a"fixed or changed commodity price"monopoly agreement,and the nature of the actions is serious and the degree of harm is relatively deep.Performance:(1)Serious exclusion and restriction of market competition.As the only three glacial acetic acid manufacturers in the market,after reaching and implementing a monopoly agreement,they uniformly raised the price of glacial acetic acid APIs,seriously disrupting the market competition order.(2)Increasing the burden on downstream pharmaceutical enterprises.Glacial acetic acid is the main raw material for the production of hemodialysis concentrate.The sharp rise in price directly increases downstream production costs and increases the cost burden of downstream pharmaceutical companies.(3)Harm the normal treatment of hemodialysis patients.The high price of raw materials for glacial acetic acid has led to downstream pharmaceutical companies reducing production and stopping production of hemodialysis concentrate,endangering the normal treatment of hemodialysis patients.However,considering that the parties were able to cooperate with the investigation,truthfully state relevant facts,actively carry out rectification,and the duration of the illegal act was relatively short,the following administrative penalty decisions were made against the three parties according to law on November 16,2018:
13.Zhongshan Gas Association Monopoly Agreement Case[13]On October 1,2010,Zhongshan Gas Association(hereinafter referred to as"the parties")formulated and implemented the"One Regulation and Two Rules of Self-discipline in the Gas Industry of Zhongshan City",which prohibits members of bottled gas supply stations from cooperating with multiple gas operating enterprises or foreign gas operating enterprises,causing gas supply enterprises to divide and control the bottled gas supply stations,eliminating and restricting market competition among enterprises,It also ensures implementation by forcing gas operating enterprises and bottled gas supply stations to join associations,collecting deposits,and establishing self-discipline inspection teams.The parties'control of the gas market in Zhongshan City has distorted the normal market competition.Through the supervision and control of the gas industry in Zhongshan City,and other means,the control has been achieved,making the competitive gas operating enterprises in Zhongshan City form an action effect of dividing the supply and marketing market of downstream bottled gas supply stations in the gas industry.At the same time,the parties specifically implemented the"Notice on Improving the Ventilation of Gas Appliance Products"issued by the Zhongshan City Gas Management Office on May 26,2016.The gas appliances have unreasonable market access barriers that have been set up in a legal system,impairing consumers'free choice rights,and eliminating and restricting full competition in the gas appliance market in Zhongshan City.
The Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission believes that the parties involved in organizing operators in their industry to engage in monopolistic acts violate the provisions of Article 16 of the Anti monopoly Law,which states that"industry associations shall not organize operators in their industry to engage in monopolistic acts prohibited by this chapter",and Article 13,which states that"operators with competitive relationships are prohibited from entering into the following monopolistic agreements:(3)Splitting the sales market",In August 2018,the following administrative penalty decision was made against the party concerned:order to stop the illegal act;And impose a fine of 150000 yuan.
(2)Civil and administrative litigation case
1 of monopoly agreement,Beijing Electric Power Company v.LS Corporation of Korea,constituting a monopoly[14]
According to a report on China Intellectual Property Information Network on September 21,2018,The Beijing Intellectual Property Court accepted a lawsuit against the plaintiff State Grid Beijing Electric Power Company(hereinafter referred to as"Beijing Electric Power Company"),which was established in September 1991 and whose business scope includes power supply,operation,maintenance,and other projects of electric equipment.The defendant LS Cable&System Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"LS Cable Company"),which was established in May 1962 in South Korea,was mainly engaged in the sales of electric cables(cables used to transmit and distribute electric energy),Is one of the world's leading enterprises in this field
Monopoly Agreement Dispute Case.
Beijing Electric Power Company claims that on April 2,2014,the European Commission determined that 11 high-voltage cable manufacturers,including LS Cable Company,had reached fixed prices for underground cables of 110 kV and above,and submarine cable products,projects,and services of 33 kV and above(hereinafter referred to as"high-voltage cable products")worldwide from 1999 to January 2009,when the European Commission conducted investigations The implementation of a"cartel"agreement that divides sales regions and customer markets(i.e.,monopolistic agreement behavior)has restricted market competition for high-voltage cable products in the European Economic Area and worldwide,and has imposed penalties totalling nearly 302 million euros on several high-voltage cable manufacturers,including LS Cable Company.As the main investment,construction and operation entity of the power grid,Beijing Electric Power Company needs to purchase a large number of high-voltage cable products for long-term use in power grid construction and power development.During the period when LS Cable Company implemented the monopolistic agreement behavior recognized by the European Commission,Beijing Electric Power Company purchased a large number of high-voltage cable products from LS Cable Company,which was seriously affected and significantly damaged by the aforementioned monopolistic agreement behavior.
For this reason,Beijing Electric Power Company claims that the aforementioned actions taken by LS Cable Company violate relevant provisions of China's anti monopoly law,price law,and other laws.It requests the court to confirm that LS Cable Company has implemented a monopoly agreement against it,and order LS Cable Company to bear all litigation costs in this case.At the same time,Beijing Electric Power Company also declares that it reserves other rights such as legal claims.
The case is currently being further tried.
2.The final judgment of the first vertical monopoly agreement dispute case in Guangdong[15]According to the report on China Court website on August 2,2018,the final judgment of the first vertical monopoly agreement dispute case in Guangdong was announced.The Guangdong Provincial High People's Court determined that the agreement signed between Dongguan Shengshi Xinxing Gree Trading Co.,Ltd.and Dongguan Heshi Electric Appliance Co.,Ltd.has a restrictive minimum resale price clause and does not constitute a vertical monopoly,maintaining the original judgment of the first instance.
The defendants Dongguan Shengshi Xinxing Gree Trading Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Shengshi Company")and Dongguan Heshi Electric Appliance Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Heshi Company")are respectively the general distributor and supplier of Gree Electric Appliance in Dongguan City.They entered into a tripartite agreement with the plaintiff Dongguan Hengli Guochang Electric Appliance Store(hereinafter referred to as"Guochang Electric Appliance Store")in 2012 and 2013,It is expressly agreed that Guochang Electric Appliance Store must comply with the relevant systems and requirements of Shengshi Company's market management standards,and the minimum retail price during the terminal sales process shall not be lower than the minimum retail price for each period,and no form of low price behavior shall occur.A deposit was collected from the plaintiff to ensure the performance of the contract.At the beginning of 2015,Heshi Company fined Guochang Electric Appliance Store 13000 yuan and did not return the earnest deposit in full,citing that Guochang Electric Appliance Store violated the agreement during February 2013 and sold a certain type of household air conditioning product at a lower retail price.In May 2015,Guochang Electric Appliance Store sued Shengshi Company and Heshi Company to the Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court,claiming that the agreement signed between Shengshi Company and it contained provisions limiting the minimum resale price,constituting a vertical monopoly agreement,and requesting compensation for losses and refund of the deposit.The joint defense of Shengshi Company and Heshi Company believes that the elimination and restriction of competitive effects are the constitutive requirements for the establishment of a vertical monopoly agreement.Although there are provisions in the tripartite agreement that limit the minimum resale price,they do not constitute a vertical monopoly agreement.
The court of second instance held that one of the focuses of controversy in the second instance of this case was whether Shengshi Company and Heshi Company constituted a vertical monopoly behavior?If it constitutes a vertical monopoly,how to bear civil liability.The analysis of the focus second trial judgment is as follows:(1)Shengshi Company,Heshi Company and Guochang Electric Appliance Store have reached and implemented an agreement to limit the minimum resale price.According to the facts ascertained by the court,Guochang Electric Appliance Store(Party C of the contract),Shengshi Company(Party A of the contract),and Heshi Company(Party B of the contract)signed a contract for the year of 2012 The 2013 tripartite agreement on the sales of household air conditioners for Gree Electric Appliances in Dongguan clearly stipulates"Party C must comply with the relevant systems and requirements of Party A's market management regulations,and the minimum retail price during the terminal sales process shall not be lower than the minimum retail price of Party A for each period,and shall not generate any form of low price behavior.If Party C violates the regulations,Party A has the right to punish it according to the relevant market regulations documents,until it cancels its business qualification,and takes back its doorstep,display cabinet,prototype,etc..."At the beginning of 2015,Heshi Company failed to refund the"maintenance sincerity deposit"paid by Guochang Electric Appliance Store for violating the agreement during February 2013 by selling a certain type of household air conditioner product at a lower retail price than the minimum retail price set by Shengshi Company,and was fined 13000 yuan by Shengshi Company according to the above agreement.The above facts indicate that between 2012 and 2013,Shengshi Company and Heshi Company reached and implemented an agreement to limit the minimum resale price with the trading counterpart Guochang Electric Appliance Store.
(2)The agreement reached in this case prohibiting the operator from entering into a minimum price limit for resale of goods to a third party with the counterparty is not a monopoly agreement.The court of second instance held that,first of all,an agreement to limit the minimum resale price specified in Article 14 of the Anti monopoly Law must have the effect of eliminating and restricting competition before it can be recognized as a monopoly agreement.Secondly,whether an agreement limiting the minimum resale price has the allocation of burden of proof to exclude and limit the effects of competition should,in principle,follow the principle of"who claims,who provides evidence"in the Civil Procedure Law,in the absence of clear provisions in laws,regulations,and judicial interpretations.However,considering that the plaintiff's ability to provide evidence is limited,and that vertical monopoly cases involve the regulation of market competition order,which is related to social and public interests,When hearing cases involving vertical monopoly agreements,the people's court should not be in a passive position on the issue of proof as in ordinary civil cases,but can take the initiative to obtain evidence ex officio according to the needs of the case.However,if relevant evidence cannot be collected after the plaintiff adduces evidence and the court retrieves evidence,the legal consequences of failing to provide evidence should still be borne by the plaintiff.The evidence in this case is insufficient to prove that the agreement to limit the minimum resale price is a monopoly agreement.
(3)The agreement to limit the minimum resale price in this case does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.The court of second instance held that although Gree's household air conditioning products have a relatively advantageous position in the relevant market,due to the relatively sufficient competition in the relevant market for household air conditioning products,it cannot be determined that Shengshi Company has the purpose of limiting the minimum resale price to achieve high monopoly profits,nor has it had serious consequences of excluding and restricting competition.Therefore,our court has legally determined that the clause limiting the minimum resale price stipulated in the"Dongguan Gree Electric Appliance Household Air Conditioner Sales Tripartite Agreement"in this case does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition,and is not a monopoly agreement prohibited by Article 14(2)of the Anti monopoly Law.
In summary,the court of second instance held that,based on the evidence provided by Guochang Electric Appliance Store and the evidence obtained by our court ex officio,although Gree's household air conditioning products have a relatively advantageous position in the relevant market,due to the relatively sufficient competition in the relevant market for household air conditioning products,it cannot be recognized that Shengshi Company has the purpose of limiting the minimum resale price to achieve high monopoly profits,Nor have there been serious consequences of excluding and restricting competition.Therefore,according to law,it is determined that the clause limiting the minimum resale price agreed in the"Dongguan Gree Electric Appliance Household Air Conditioner Sales Tripartite Agreement"does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition,and is not a monopoly agreement prohibited by Article 14(2)of the Anti monopoly Law.Shengshi Company and Heshi Company do not constitute a vertical monopoly and do not bear civil liability.
Accordingly,the court of second instance held in accordance with the law that the clause limiting the minimum resale price agreed upon in the tripartite agreement in this case did not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition,and was not a monopoly agreement prohibited by the antitrust law.Shengshi Company and Heshi Company did not constitute a vertical monopoly behavior,so it rejected the lawsuit request of Guochang Electric Appliance Store in accordance with the law.
3.The first case of disputes over vertical monopoly agreements and abuse of market dominance in China was concluded and the Shanghai Intellectual Property Court issued a first instance judgment[16](no judgment was found).It is reported that,On July 27,2018,the Shanghai Intellectual Property Court(hereinafter referred to as the"Shanghai Intellectual Property Court")concluded the case of the plaintiff Wuhan Hanyang Guangming Trade Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as the"Guangming Company")v.the defendant Shanghai Hantai Tire Sales Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as the"Hantai Company")concerning the dispute over the vertical monopoly agreement and the abuse of market dominance.The first instance decision rejected all the plaintiff's claims.
The defendant Hantai Company is the general distributor of Hantai tires in China.The plaintiff Guangming Company acted as the defendant's distributor from January 2012 to June 2016,acting as an agent for the wholesale sales of Hantai brand passenger car tires in Wuhan.In the course of the transaction,the plaintiff believed that the defendant reached and implemented a monopoly agreement limiting the minimum price for resale of Hantai tire products to a third party,and engaged in a monopolistic act of abusing its market support position by wholesale selling tire products at an unfair high price higher than the market terminal retail price.Therefore,Guangming Company filed a lawsuit with the Shanghai Intellectual Property Court,requesting the court to order Hantai Company to immediately stop abusing its dominant market position and compensate Guangming Company for various losses totaling over 31 million yuan.Hantai argued that the evidence provided by the plaintiff was a clause in the 2012 special distribution agreement,which was deleted after 2014 and 2015,and does not constitute a vertical monopoly agreement.Hantai has no dominant market position globally or nationally,and its actions do not constitute monopolistic behavior.
After hearing,the Shanghai Intellectual Property Court held that"the passenger car tire replacement market in Chinese Mainland"was the most directly affected market and the most influential market for consumers'interests,which should be the most concerned market in the hearing of the case.After the court's trial,it was found that the brand competition in the relevant market of this case is quite sufficient,and the mid range tire products where the Hantai brand is located are highly competitive;Hantai Company does not have pricing power in relevant markets,let alone a dominant market position;Although Hantai Company reached and implemented a minimum resale price agreement with dealers from 2012 to 2013,from 2012 to 2016,the consumption volume in the three relevant markets of the case increased year by year and the price decreased year by year.The factory price,minimum resale price,and retail price of Hantai brand tires also decreased year by year,indicating that there is effective brand competition in the relevant markets of the case.Accordingly,the Shanghai Intellectual Property Court determined that the minimum resale price restrictions imposed by the defendant did not have the effect of excluding or restricting market competition,and did not constitute a monopoly agreement.The Shanghai Intellectual Property Court ruled against all the plaintiff's claims.
4.Civil Judgment of Second Instance on Monopoly Agreement Dispute between Shucheng County Commercial Concrete Association and Anhui Huaheng New Building Materials Co.,Ltd.[17]In July 2018,the Anhui Provincial High People's Court issued a second instance judgment on the case where the appellant Shucheng County Commercial Concrete Association(hereinafter referred to as"Shucheng Concrete Association")had a monopoly agreement dispute with the appellee Anhui Huaheng New Building Materials Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Huaheng Company").
On March 18,2015,Shucheng Qiangli Concrete Commodity Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Qiangli Company"),Anhui Furifeng New Building Materials Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Furifeng Company"),Huaheng Company,Anhui Huachao Concrete Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Huachao Company"),Shucheng County Jiangrun Building Materials Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Jiangrun Company")Anhui Rui'ao Concrete Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Rui'ao Company")has jointly signed the Agreement on the Restructuring of the Concrete Association of Shucheng County,which mainly stipulates that:(1)within the framework of the information price of the concrete supplied in the market around Shucheng area,the standard is C25,and the tentative pumping price is 330 yuan per cubic meter.Any company is not allowed to arbitrarily adjust the price,and once found,it will be treated as illegal;(2)Determine the percentage of concrete required by six enterprises in the Shucheng market(omitted).The actual sales volume is calculated and settled on a daily basis.Companies that produce more will be paid 50 yuan per cubic meter in cash to companies that produce less.The membership fee is remitted to the association account at a rate of 10 yuan per production party,which belongs to the publicly managed fund of the association;(3)Six member units must remit the amount of integrity deposit to the association's account(omitted,including 500000 yuan from Huaheng Company);(4)If a member unit violates regulations or bylaws,uses the restructuring platform to trick other member units,and takes the opportunity to sign a large number of concrete contracts,then proposes to withdraw from the association.In addition to remitting the integrity deposit of the association,it will also pay a penalty of 15 million yuan to compensate for the losses of the observant party.The observant party will divide the penalty of the observant party according to the proportion of concrete resources received by the observant party.On March 30,2016,the above six enterprises jointly signed the"Resolution of Shucheng County Commercial Concrete Association on Strengthening Self-discipline and Jointly Maintaining Market Order",which supplements the aforementioned restructuring agreement as follows:(1)Based on the unchanged distribution proportion in the original agreement,the specific market share has been adjusted(omitted);(2)According to the application of Huaheng Company for increasing its market share on March 16,2016,the Association decided to add 50000 cubic meters of concrete to Huaheng Company every year without participating in the square meters.The calculation is based on 11 months or 335 days per year,and 150 cubic meters per day are divided by the square meters of the current day.If 50000 cubic meters are not reached at the end of the year,a one-time supplement will be made;(3)Regarding the price of concrete,the price of concrete sold by members must be based on the information price of Shucheng County in the construction project cost of Lu'an City,which can be lowered to five to eight points.In special circumstances,a temporary meeting is held to decide,and if the member unit voluntarily lowers by more than eight points,the association will not provide any compensation;(4)In order to enhance the stability of the Association,all member units jointly agreed to increase the deposit by 500000 yuan on the basis of the original deposit,and the increased amount of the deposit(omitted,including 1 million yuan for Huaheng Company).On April 6,2016,Huaheng Company issued a receipt stating that it owed Shucheng Concrete Association a square meter payment and membership fee of 500000 yuan.
The Anhui Provincial High People's Court held that the focus of the dispute in the second instance of this case was whether there was a factual and legal basis for the Shucheng Concrete Association to sue Huaheng Company to pay it the arrears of membership dues and the average amount of 1845984 yuan.In this case,the Shucheng Concrete Association sued Huaheng Company to pay its arrears of membership fees and average square footage of 1845984 yuan,based on two agreements signed by six concrete enterprises,including Qiangli Company and Huaheng Company,on the Restructuring Agreement of the Shucheng County Concrete Association and the Resolution of the Shucheng County Commercial Concrete Association on Strengthening Self-discipline and Jointly Maintaining Market Order.However,the contents of these two agreements divide the concrete market in Shucheng and restrict the sales price and production and sales quantity of concrete by each member unit.They are monopoly agreements stipulated in Article 13 of the Anti monopoly Law,and have the effect of eliminating and restricting competition.Therefore,the above agreements violate the mandatory provisions of the Anti monopoly Law and should be deemed invalid.Therefore,according to the aforementioned invalid agreement,the Shucheng Concrete Association requested Huaheng Company to continue to pay the arrears in square meters,which has no legal basis.It rejected the appeal request of the Shucheng Concrete Association for Huaheng Company to pay the arrears in membership fees,and upheld the original judgment.
5.In November 2019,the Intermediate People's Court of Guiyang City,Guizhou Province,filed a lawsuit against ten driving schools in Guizhou Province against the Guizhou Provincial Development and Reform Commission for price administrative punishment.The lawsuit was filed against Kaili Automobile Driving Training School in Qiandongnan Prefecture,Lilong Driving Training School Co.,Ltd.in Qiandongnan Prefecture,Jintong Driving School Co.,Ltd.in Zhenyuan County,Jiajie Driver Training School in Majiang County,Kaishuntong Driving Training Center in Kaili City Shibing County Heng'an Motor Vehicle Driving Training School,Qiandongnan Prefecture Guilong Motor Vehicle Driving Skill Training School Co.,Ltd.,Guizhou Qiandongnan Prefecture Jinkai Driving School,Kaili City Hejie Motor Vehicle Driving Training Co.,Ltd Qiandongnan Xinghua Driving Training School Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as the"Ten Driving Schools")and Kaili Motor Vehicle Driver Training Industry Association(hereinafter referred to as the"Association")respectively made a first instance judgment in the case of the defendant Guizhou Development and Reform Commission(hereinafter referred to as the"Provincial Development and Reform Commission")against the price administrative penalty.
On September 29,2017,ten driving schools and associations filed a lawsuit with the People's Court of Nanming District,Guiyang City(hereinafter referred to as"Nanming Court")because they did not accept the administrative penalty imposed by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission.As the case was an administrative case of first instance against monopoly,the Nanming Court ruled on August 6,2018 to transfer the case to the Intermediate People's Court of Guiyang City,Guizhou Province.
Upon trial,the court found that on December 20,2016,the Provincial Development and Reform Commission received a case clue from the National Development and Reform Commission,believing that"the behavior of the Qiandongnan driving school industry adopting a joint venture model and unifying the charging standards for contracted vehicle management fees"is suspected of violating the provisions of Article 13 of the Anti monopoly Law.On December 21,2016,the Provincial Development and Reform Commission launched an investigation into the suspected price monopoly in the driving training industry in Qiandongnan Prefecture.On April 11,2017,the Provincial Development and Reform Commission conducted a survey of ten driving schools and associations,questioned relevant personnel,and retrieved relevant documents and materials from relevant associations.On July 19th,2017,"The Provincial Development and Reform Commission's Notice of Administrative Penalty in Advance states:"This authority believes that your unit's participation in reaching a unified price agreement violates Article 13,Paragraph 1(1)of the Anti monopoly Law."The provisions of item are illegal acts of entering into a'fixing or changing commodity prices'monopoly agreement with competitive operators...The price monopoly agreement entered into with your unit's participation excludes and restricts market competition in the motor vehicle driving training industry in Qiandongnan Prefecture,but the agreement reached has not yet been implemented.Accordingly,in accordance with the provisions of Article 46,Paragraph 1,and Article 49 of the Anti monopoly Law,the plaintiff was informed that it intends to deal with it as follows:(1)Order the immediate cessation of the illegal act;(2)Impose a fine of 50000 yuan."The notice was sent to ten driving schools and associations.".Ten driving schools and associations have submitted written pleadings to the Provincial Development and Reform Commission,stating that there are no facts suspected of violating the law and that there are legal errors in the notification.After collective discussion,the Provincial Development and Reform Commission believes that,"Since December 2014,the government has liberalized the charging items for motor vehicle driving training services,which are no longer priced by the government,and implemented market regulation with the aim of returning to the market and protecting competition.The agreement reached with your company's participation excludes and restricts market competition in the motor vehicle driving training industry in Qiandongnan Prefecture,and belongs to a monopoly agreement.However,the agreed items have not yet been implemented."Therefore,on August 25,2017,according to the Anti monopoly Law According to Article 46 and Article 49,administrative penalties shall be imposed on ten driving schools and associations respectively:(1)Order the suspension of illegal acts;(2)Ten driving schools were fined 50000 yuan,and the association was fined 150000 yuan.Ten driving schools and associations refused to accept the above administrative penalties,so they filed a lawsuit in court to revoke the administrative penalty decision made by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission.
It was also found that on May 30,2016,15 local driving training schools in southwestern Guizhou,including ten driving schools and associations,signed the"Agreement"to:,"Implement unified and standardized management for coaches","Implement unified standards for the collection of contracted vehicle contracting fees(affiliated vehicle affiliated fees)","Protect the lowest cost training fees","Verify the minimum cost of c1 and c2 driver license training,and on the basis of the lowest cost price,appropriately determine the registration prices for various training types and class types of the school and announce to the public","The collection of contracted vehicle contracting fees(affiliated fees)must be at least 2280 yuan/person.""A fine of 50000 yuan will be imposed for enrolling students below the published price.".Kelly Driving School has affixed its official seal to the Agreement,but has not actually implemented the Agreement.
The court believes that the key focus of the dispute in this case is:(1)Does the Provincial Development and Reform Commission have the statutory responsibility to make the administrative penalty decision against which the case is prosecuted.According to the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Anti monopoly Law,there are two types of subjects conducting anti monopoly law enforcement:one is the anti monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council,namely the National Development and Reform Commission;The other is the corresponding institutions of the people's governments of provinces,autonomous regions,and municipalities directly under the Central Government authorized by the National Development and Reform Commission.In order to prevent acts of restricting competition due to price monopolies,the National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC),in accordance with Article 1 of the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on the Authorization of Anti Price Monopoly Law Enforcement(FGJJ[2008]No.3509)formulated by the Anti Monopoly Law,as the provincial price administrative department in Guizhou,belongs to the corresponding institutions of the people's governments of provinces,autonomous regions,and municipalities directly under the Central Government authorized by the National Development and Reform Commission as mentioned in the preceding provisions.Therefore,the Provincial Development and Reform Commission has the statutory responsibility to make the administrative penalty decision against the defendant in this case.(2)Whether the content of the"Agreement"signed by Kelly Driving School belongs to horizontal price monopoly,and whether its behavior constitutes a price monopoly.Price monopoly usually refers to market operations in which operators abuse their dominant or dominant market position,or two or more operators manipulate and control market prices,crowd out price competition,and infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of other operators and consumers through collusion or collusion.Therefore,price competition,as the main means of market competition,is also the most effective means of adjusting market transactions.In this case,ten driving schools are operators engaged in motor vehicle driving training services,both belonging to driving training schools in Qianxinan Prefecture.The ten driving schools have a homogeneous competitive relationship in market operation.Under the organization of relevant associations,15 driving training schools in southeastern Guizhou,including 10 driving schools,have held meetings to negotiate the price components of goods or services related to the joint operation mode of C1 and C2 licenses,training capabilities,vehicle management,management fees,minimum cost standard prices,punishment methods and amounts for violating the minimum cost standard prices of the participating driving training schools,in order to avoid vicious competition,A minimum cost standard price has been agreed,and it is determined that participating driving training schools can only float up the cost of driving training based on the minimum cost standard price.The three associations mentioned above shall be the main body of information release,and shall announce the relevant contents of the Agreement to the public in the form of announcement or briefing.The behavior of Kelley Driving School and its competitors in the same industry is called"avoiding vicious competition"and"standardizing industry behavior".In fact,by fixing the cost and price of driving training services,the training price in the local motor vehicle driving training service industry is kept fixed.This behavior excludes and restricts market competition in the local driving training industry,deprives consumers of their right to choose independently,and runs counter to the national policy of opening up price controls for motor vehicle driving training services,which is guided by market independent price regulation.It belongs to a horizontal price monopoly behavior prohibited by Article 13 of the Anti monopoly Law,and should be recognized as a horizontal price monopoly agreement.(3)Whether the above"Agreement"has been reached.According to the basic principles of civil law,a contract is the result of autonomy of both or more parties.As long as both or more parties to the agreement have the ability to autonomy,reach a consensus on the main content of the contract,and sign or seal on the contract,it is deemed that the contract is established.In this case,ten driving schools are driving training schools with independent legal personality.As the parties to the Agreement,the ten driving schools have affixed their official seals to the Agreement,which is deemed to recognize the relevant contents of the Agreement,and the contents of the Agreement are binding on the parties participating in the signing.In addition,even if 9 driving training schools participating in the negotiation fail to sign the agreement,it will not affect the recognition of the agreement between the 15 signed driving training schools.Therefore,the above-mentioned"Agreement"has been reached.Finally,ten driving schools and associations participated in the negotiation and signed the above-mentioned"Agreement",but due to their actual operation,they did not fulfill the agreement,According to Article 46 of the Anti monopoly Law,"If an operator violates the provisions of this Law and reaches a monopoly agreement,the anti monopoly law enforcement agency shall order it to stop the illegal act,confiscate its illegal income,and impose a fine of not less than 1%but not more than 10%of the sales volume of the previous year.If the monopoly agreement reached has not yet been implemented,it may be imposed a fine of not more than 500000 yuan.",The administrative penalty decisions made by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission against ten driving schools and associations involved in the case are legal in procedure,with sufficient evidence and correct application of laws.In summary,the petitions of ten driving schools and associations have no factual or legal basis,and the court rejected them according to law.
Section 2:Analysis and Comment on the Law Enforcement of Monopoly Agreement Cases in 2018:
1.Relationship between Law Enforcement Entities,Law Enforcement Industries,and Law Enforcement Regions.The number of administrative penalty cases under monopoly agreements in 2018 was significantly reduced from 30 cases last year,to only 13 cases.From the perspective of law enforcement entities and regional relationships,the law enforcement areas of monopoly agreement cases in 2018 involved provinces and cities such as Shaanxi,Shandong,Guangdong,Guangxi,Heilongjiang,Henan,Tianjin,and Sichuan,which became smaller than last year.Beijing,Shanghai,Zhejiang,Anhui,and Jiangsu did not have administrative penalties for monopoly agreements in 2018.Among them,the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration issued 3 copies,the National Development and Reform Commission issued 1 copy,the local price bureau issued 2 copies(including Shaanxi Provincial Price Bureau and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Price Bureau each issued 1 copy),and the local industrial and commercial administration issued 3 copies(including Shandong Provincial Industrial and Commercial Administration issued 2 copies,and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Industrial and Commercial Administration issued 1 copy)The local development and reform commission has issued 3 copies(including 2 copies by the Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission and 1 copy by the Tianjin Municipal Development and Reform Commission).
From the above analysis,it can be seen that the State Administration for Industry and Commerce and the National Development and Reform Commission,after the institutional reform of the State Council,are still the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration,and are still the main law enforcement entities in monopoly agreement cases.However,the number of law enforcement cases decreased in 2018,with the number of cases announced accounting for 33%of the total number of cases falling from 70%in 2017;At the same time,provincial and municipal law enforcement agencies are gradually increasing their enforcement efforts.In 2018,the number of cases announced by provincial and municipal law enforcement agencies increased from 30%in 2017 to 66%of the total number of cases.From the current trend,the number of law enforcement cases by provincial and municipal law enforcement agencies will gradually increase in the future.
The industries involved in the 2018 monopoly agreement case include accounting,natural gas,fireworks,driving school training,shopping malls,civil air defense equipment,tugboats,tally,logistics,engineering testing,pharmaceutical raw materials,and other fields.From the perspective of types of violations,there is little difference from past cases,with the number of cases of fixed commodity prices decreasing,accounting for 50%;The rest involve reselling the lowest price of goods to third parties,splitting the sales market,boycotting transactions,and other types.In 2018,the number of cases involving industry association monopoly agreements decreased from 5 in 2017 to 3.
In 2018,the number of civil and case cases in monopoly agreement cases increased compared to previous years,with 3 civil cases closed,1 pending,and 2 administrative litigation cases closed.
2、The application of confiscation of illegal income and penalty ratio From the practice of 30 monopoly agreement enforcement cases in 2017,there were no confiscations of illegal income in the cases punished by the National Development and Reform Commission and local provincial law enforcement agencies in 2017.Only five enterprises such as Gushi County Fireworks and Firecrackers Factory in the monopoly agreement cases punished by the national industrial and commercial system confiscated illegal income in the monopoly agreement cases.However,in 2018,there were two cases where illegal gains were confiscated in the 12 enforcement cases of monopoly agreements,namely,three engineering testing companies in Henan Province and three glacial acetic acid raw material production enterprises.From the perspective of the proportion of cases where illegal gains were confiscated,there was an increase compared to 2017.
There is still no exemption system applicable to monopoly agreement cases in 2018,and so far,based on the disclosed information,there has been no exemption law enforcement case since China's Anti monopoly Law came into effect.
Looking at the penalty ratio in 2018 as a whole,the penalty ratio of the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration is 4%,and the penalty ratio of the National Development and Reform Commission is 6%;The proportion of fines imposed by provincial law enforcement agencies is high,ranging from 1%to 7%.
It is worth mentioning that in the case of Tianjin Port Shore Yard Company Monopoly Agreement,the Tianjin Development and Reform Commission made a decision to exempt Tianjin Foreign Logistics Co.,Ltd.from administrative penalties.The reason is that during the investigation,Tianjin Foreign Logistics Co.,Ltd.was able to actively cooperate and actively stop illegal activities,The first person to take the initiative to report on the conclusion of the price monopoly agreement and provide important evidence.Therefore,the Tianjin Development and Reform Commission has made a decision to exempt its decision-makers from administrative penalties in accordance with the law.
3、Determination of the Elements of Monopoly Agreement and the Burden of Proof in Civil Dispute Cases[19]The Guochang Electric Appliance Store in Hengli,Dongguan City(hereinafter referred to as"Guochang Store")Dongguan Shengshi Xinxing Gree Trading Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as"Shengshi Company")has provided a detailed analysis of the determination of monopoly agreements in civil disputes in the second instance civil judgment:(1)The monopoly agreements stipulated in Article 14 of the Anti monopoly Law,including horizontal monopoly agreements and vertical monopoly agreements,are all composed of the effect of eliminating and restricting competition.
The court held that an agreement to limit the minimum resale price stipulated in Article 14 of the Anti monopoly Law must have the effect of eliminating and restricting competition in order to be recognized as a monopoly agreement.The reasons are as follows:1.Article 13 of the Anti monopoly Law lists six types of horizontal monopoly agreements in the first paragraph,and the second paragraph stipulates that"monopoly agreements referred to in this Law refer to agreements,decisions,or other collaborative actions that exclude or restrict competition.".Since the expression takes"this Law"as the attributive,it should not only apply to one provision but also to the entire law.Therefore,the definition of this monopoly agreement also applies to the provisions of Article 14 on vertical monopoly agreements.The above definition of"monopoly agreement"clearly defines"agreements,decisions,or other collaborative actions that exclude or restrict competition.".However,logically speaking,it is not possible to counter the assertion that all agreements with content that excludes or restricts competition are monopoly agreements and should be stopped without distinction.For agreements between operators and trading counterparts to exclude or restrict competition,it is necessary to comprehensively consider the impact on competition order,economic efficiency,and the impact on consumers and social public interests before reaching a conclusion whether they are monopolistic agreements.Article 7 of the Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Disputes Caused by Monopoly Practices stipulates that"if the accused monopoly behavior belongs to a monopoly agreement specified in Article 13,Paragraph 1(1)to(5)of the Anti monopoly Law,the accused shall bear the burden of proof that the agreement does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.".Therefore,the horizontal agreement stipulated in Article 13 constitutes a monopoly agreement,which should be premised on the premise that the agreement has the effect of eliminating and restricting competition.Given that horizontal agreements that constitute monopolies have a strong market impact and have a greater effect on restricting competition than vertical agreements,according to the principle of lifting the weight with a lighter weight,vertical agreements that have a relatively weak market impact should have a necessary condition of eliminating and restricting competition.
(2)Whether an agreement limiting the minimum resale price has the burden of proof to exclude and limit the competitive effect should follow the principle of"whoever claims,who adduces evidence."However,considering the limited evidentiary capacity of the plaintiff and the regulation of the market competition order involved in vertical monopoly cases,it is possible to actively obtain evidence ex officio based on the needs of the case.
The court held that because the effect of vertical agreements on the market is generally not as direct and obvious as horizontal agreements,it is not appropriate to apply the provisions of Article 7 of the"Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Trial of Monopoly Disputes"on horizontal agreements by analogy,that is,the defendant should bear the burden of proof for the agreement not having the effect of excluding or restricting competition.In the absence of clear provisions in laws,regulations,and judicial interpretations,the principle of"whoever claims,who adduces evidence"in the Civil Procedure Law should be followed,and the plaintiff should bear the burden of proof as to whether the agreement limiting the minimum resale price in this case has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.However,considering that the plaintiff's ability to adduce evidence is limited and that vertical monopoly cases involve the regulation of market competition order and are related to social and public interests,the people's court should not be in a passive position on the issue of adducing evidence as in ordinary civil cases when trying cases involving vertical monopoly agreements,and can actively obtain evidence ex officio according to the needs of the case.However,if relevant evidence cannot be collected after the plaintiff adduces evidence and the court retrieves evidence,the legal consequences of failing to provide evidence should still be borne by the plaintiff.
(3)The purpose and consequences of restricting the minimum resale price act are important factors in determining whether the act can have a restrictive competitive effect and determining the nature of the agreement limiting the minimum resale price.
Regarding the purpose of restricting the minimum resale price behavior,the court held that the purpose of restricting the minimum resale price behavior by Shengshi Company should be judged based on the specific circumstances of the case.The existing evidence indicates that the domestic air conditioning commodity market is fully competitive.Shengshi Company imposes a minimum resale price limit on distributors.If the purpose is to enable consumers to purchase Gree household air conditioning products at a high cost,thereby obtaining a high monopoly profit,consumers can completely choose to abandon Gree household air conditioning products and purchase other household air conditioning products,which is not wise for Shengshi Company.After all,based on existing evidence,in the household air conditioning industry,Gree household air conditioning products are not yet up to the level that consumers must buy or indispensable.Therefore,the Court confirms that the purpose of restricting the minimum resale price of Shengshi Company is not to obtain high monopoly profits by eliminating and restricting competition.
Regarding the consequences of restricting the minimum resale price,the court held that restricting the minimum resale price may both restrict competition and may have a certain promotional effect on competition.For example,limiting the minimum resale price agreement will objectively strengthen competition between brands while preventing competition among distributors within the brand;For another example,limiting the minimum resale price agreement can solve the problem of"free riding"between dealers,and prevent dealers from engaging in vicious competition by reducing the price difference;For example,maintaining a relatively reasonable price for goods that already have a good reputation and market share is conducive to promoting new brands and products to enter relevant markets.According to the existing evidence,it is not yet possible to prove that the agreement limiting the minimum resale price in this case has serious consequences of excluding and restricting competition.
In summary,the court held that although Gree's household air conditioning products have a relatively advantageous position in the relevant markets,due to the relatively sufficient competition in the relevant markets for household air conditioning products,it cannot be determined that Shengshi Company has the purpose of limiting the minimum resale price to achieve high monopoly profits,nor has it had serious consequences of excluding and restricting competition.Therefore,our court has legally determined that the clause limiting the minimum resale price stipulated in the"Dongguan Gree Electric Appliance Household Air Conditioner Sales Tripartite Agreement"in this case does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition,and is not a monopoly agreement prohibited by Article 14(2)of the Anti monopoly Law.Shengshi Company and Heshi Company do not constitute a vertical monopoly and do not bear civil liability.
The presiding judge of this case,Xiao Ming,Deputy Chief Justice of the Third Civil Court of the Guangdong High Court,said that this case will have a positive impact:while limiting the minimum resale price agreement to curb competition among distributors within the brand,it will objectively strengthen competition between brands,and limiting the minimum resale price agreement can solve the problem of"free riding"between distributors,preventing dealers from engaging in vicious competition by reducing price differences.In addition,maintaining a relatively reasonable price for goods that already have a good reputation and market share is conducive to promoting new brands and products to enter relevant markets.Thirdly,from the perspective of protecting the vitality of the market economy,operators'adherence to brand positioning,quality positioning,and price positioning is within the scope of independent enterprise operation.As long as they do not achieve the degree of eliminating and restricting competition,it is not appropriate to hold a negative attitude towards all behaviors of operators to establish brand value and prevent low-cost competition.
[20]4.The Legislation of Monopoly Agreements in 2018[21]In order to fully implement the spirit of the reform of the Party and state institutions,do a good job of unified anti monopoly law enforcement,and prevent and suppress acts of monopoly agreements,the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration has drafted the"Provisions on Prohibiting Acts of Monopoly Agreements(Draft for Comments)"(hereinafter referred to as the"Provisions"),and publicly solicited opinions from the public from January 3,2019 to February 3,2019.There are two significant changes in the draft that deserve attention:
序号
案例标题
处罚机构
地域
案号
处罚时间
性质
罚款金额（单位：元）
罚款比例
1
江苏省工商行政管理局
江苏省
苏工商案字【2010】第00037号
2010-08-31
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
200,000.00
2
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]2号
2012-03-06
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
1,670,000.00
3
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]3号
2012-03-12
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
1,170,000.00
4
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]5号
2012-03-23
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
1,020,000.00
5
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]19号
2012-05-17
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
100,000.00
6
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]6号
2012-05-17
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
2,010,000.00
7
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]17号
2012-05-17
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
500,000.00
8
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]18号
2012-05-17
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
500,000.00
9
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]7号
2012-06-25
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
1,700,000.00
10
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]10号
2012-06-25
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
1,950,000.00
11
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]11号
2012-06-25
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
1,200,000.00
12
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]9号
2012-06-26
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
1,200,000.00
13
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]8号
2012-06-27
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
1,010,000.00
14
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]23号
2012-08-13
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
500,000.00
15
辽宁省工商行政管理局
辽宁省
辽工商处字[2012]24号
2012-08-13
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
500,000.00
16
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2012〕1号
2012-11-30
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
400,000.00
17
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2012〕3号
2012-12-03
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
450,000.00
18
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2012〕4号
2012-12-03
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
450,000.00
19
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2012〕2号
2012-12-03
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
400,000.00
20
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案〔2012〕16号
2012-12-14
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
1,183,200.00
21
四川省工商行政管理局
四川省
川工商处字〔2013〕7001号
2013-03-06
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
120,000.00
22
四川省工商行政管理局
四川省
川工商处字〔2013〕7003号
2013-03-06
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
500,000.00
23
四川省工商行政管理局
四川省
川工商处字〔2013〕7004号
2013-03-06
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
110,000.00
24
四川省工商行政管理局
四川省
川工商处字〔2013〕7005号
2013-03-06
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
170,000.00
25
四川省工商行政管理局
四川省
川工商处字〔2013〕7006号
2013-03-27
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
100,000.00
26
四川省工商行政管理局
四川省
川工商处字〔2013〕7007号
2013-03-27
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量
60,000.00
27
云南省工商行政管理局
云南省
云工商竞争处字（2013）第01号
2013-04-07
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
400,000.00
28
云南省工商行政管理局
云南省
云工商竞争处字（2013）第02号
2013-04-07
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
400,000.00
29
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕03号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
418,100.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
30
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕04号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
190,100.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
31
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕05号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
84,100.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
32
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕06号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
118,900.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
33
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕07号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
99,100.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
34
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕08号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
23,900.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
35
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕09号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
23,400.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
36
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕10号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
14,400.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
37
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕11号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
1,800.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
38
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2013〕12号
2013-11-04
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
9,000.00
上一年度新车保险销售额1%的罚款
39
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕29号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
1,370,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额1.37亿元人民币处以1%罚款
40
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕28号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
628,300.00
按照2012年度商业车险销售额6283万元人民币处以1%罚款
41
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕27号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
4,080,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额4.08亿元人民币处以1%罚款
42
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕26号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
2,760,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额2.76亿元人民币处以1%罚款
43
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕25号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
6,700,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额6.7亿元人民币处以1%罚款
44
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕24号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
2,450,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额2.45亿元人民币处以1%罚款
45
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕23号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
347,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额3470万元人民币处以1%罚款
46
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕22号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
382,500.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额3825万元人民币处以1%罚款
47
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕21号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
9,550,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额9.55亿元人民币处以1%罚款
48
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕20号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
3,000,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额3亿元人民币处以1%罚款
49
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕19号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
1,900,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额1.9亿元人民币处以1%罚款
50
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕18号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
2,060,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额2.06亿元人民币处以1%罚款
51
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕17号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
2,370,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额2.37亿元人民币处以1%罚款
52
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书[2013]16号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
5,050,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额5.05亿元人民币处以1%罚款
53
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书[2013]15号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
2,430,000.00
按照2012年度商业车险销售额2.43亿元人民币处以1%罚款
54
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书[2013]14号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
4,040,000.00
按照2012年度商业车险销售额4.04亿元人民币处以1%罚款
55
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书[2013]13号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
9,600,000.00
按照2012年度商业车险销售额9.6亿元人民币处以1%罚款
56
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书[2013]12号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
2,870,000.00
按照2012年度商业车险销售额2.87亿元人民币处以1%罚款
57
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书[2013]11号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
10,290,000.00
按照2012年度商业车险销售额10.29亿元人民币处以1%罚款
58
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕10号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
20,700,000.00
按照2012年度商业车险销售额20.7亿元人民币处以1%罚款
59
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕9号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
15,994,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额29.08亿元处以1%罚款，并按照45%减轻处罚
60
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕8号
2013-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
1,127,000.00
按2012年度商业车险销售额11.27亿元处以1%罚款，并按照90%减轻处罚
61
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2013〕7号
2013-12-30
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
500,000.00
62
内蒙古自治区工商行政管理局
内蒙古自治区
内工商处罚字〔2014〕001号
2014-05-27
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
583,700.00
63
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520140018号
2014-06-10
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
8,790,200.00
处2012年度销售额（略）元之2%的罚款
64
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520140017号
2014-06-10
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
3,643,700.00
处2012年度销售额（略）元之1%的罚款
65
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2014〕13号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
109,360,000.00
按照20％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内轴承销售额8％的罚款
66
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2014〕12号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
119,160,000.00
按照40％的幅度减轻处罚，处2013年度中国境内轴承销售额6％的罚款
67
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2014〕11号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
174,920,000.00
按照60％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内轴承销售额4％的罚款
68
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2014〕9号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
290,400,000.00
按照40％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内线束销售额6％的罚款
69
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2014〕8号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
34,560,000.00
按照40％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内线束销售额6％的罚款
70
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2014〕7号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
241,080,000.00
按照40％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内线束销售额6％的罚款
71
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
国家发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书〔2014〕6号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
40,720,000.00
按照20％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内涉案产品销售额8％的罚款
72
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]3号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
150,560,000.00
按照60％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内涉案产品销售额4％的罚款
73
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]4号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
29,760,000.00
按照20％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内涉案产品销售额8％的罚款
74
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]5号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
44,880,000.00
按照20％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内涉案产品销售额8％的罚款
75
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]6号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
40,720,000.00
按照20％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内涉案产品销售额8％的罚款
76
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]7号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
241,080,000.00
按照40％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内线束销售额6％的罚款
77
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]8号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
34,560,000.00
按照40％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内线束销售额6％的罚款
78
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]9号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
290,400,000.00
按照40％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内线束销售额6％的罚款
79
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]11号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
174,920,000.00
按照60％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内轴承销售额4％的罚款
80
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]12号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
119,160,000.00
按照40％的幅度减轻处罚，处2013年度中国境内轴承销售额6％的罚款
81
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
发改办价监处罚[2014]13号
2014-08-15
固定或者变更商品价格
109,360,000.00
按照20％的幅度减轻罚款，处2013年度中国境内轴承销售额8％的罚款
82
重庆市工商行政管理局
重庆市
渝工商经处字〔2014〕5号
2014-08-18
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
400,000.00
83
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520140077号
2014-08-18
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
31,682,000.00
处2013年度相关销售额（略）元之3%的罚款
84
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520140078号
2014-08-18
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
996,000.00
处2013年度相关销售额（略）元之6%的罚款
85
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520140079号
2014-08-18
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
521,000.00
处2013年度相关销售额（略）元之4%的罚款
86
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520140080号
2014-08-18
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
625,100.00
处2013年度相关销售额（略）元之4%的罚款
87
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】9号
2014-09-05
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
10,000.00
88
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】10号
2014-09-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
400,000.00
89
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】11号
2014-09-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
250,000.00
90
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】12号
2014-09-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
250,000.00
91
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】13号
2014-09-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
250,000.00
92
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】14号
2014-09-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
250,000.00
93
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】15号
2014-09-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
150,000.00
94
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】16号
2014-09-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
150,000.00
95
浙江省工商行政管理局
浙江省
浙工商案【2014】17号
2014-09-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
10,000.00
96
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字（2014）1号
2014-12-31
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
106,000.00
97
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字（2014）3号
2014-12-31
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
147,500.00
98
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字（2014）2号
2014-12-31
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
152,000.00
99
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字（2014）4号
2014-12-31
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
74,000.00
100
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字（2014）5号
2014-12-31
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
133,900.00
101
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字（2014）6号
2014-12-31
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
54,000.00
102
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字[2015]3号
2015-01-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
167,200.00
103
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字[2015]1号
2015-01-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
205,000.00
104
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字[2015]2号
2015-01-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
153,800.00
105
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商经总案处字[2015]4号
2015-01-05
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
196,000.00
106
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕3号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
20,000.00
107
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕4号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
20,000.00
108
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕5号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
20,000.00
109
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕6号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
20,000.00
110
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕7号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
20,000.00
111
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕8号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
20,000.00
112
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕9号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
300,000.00
113
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕10号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
100,000.00
114
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕11号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
20,000.00
115
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕12号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
20,000.00
116
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕13号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
948.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
117
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕14号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
2,043.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
118
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕15号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
8,608.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
119
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕16号
2015-02-03
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
200,000.00
120
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕17号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
672.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
121
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕18号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
97.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
122
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕19号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
11,604.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
123
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕20号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,773.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
124
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕21号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
10,350.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
125
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕22号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
2,073.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
126
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕23号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,116.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
127
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕24号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,572.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
128
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕25号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
11,542.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
129
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕26号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,948.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
130
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕27号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,545.00
2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
131
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕28号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
3,456.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
132
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕29号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
10,049.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
133
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕30号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,928.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
134
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕31号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,955.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
135
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕32号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
10,300.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
136
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕33号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,239.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
137
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕34号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
4,824.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
138
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕35号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,547.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
139
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕36号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
487.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
140
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕37号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
3,633.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
141
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕38号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,478.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
142
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕39号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
339.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
143
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕40号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
688.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
144
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕41号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,575.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
145
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕42号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
1,309.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
146
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕43号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
570.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
147
四川省发展和改革委员会
四川省
川发改价检处〔2015〕44号
2015-02-03
固定或者变更商品价格
2,852.00
按2013年二级维护工时费收入（略）元的3%处以罚款
148
湖北省工商行政管理局
湖北省
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3012号
2015-06-03
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
14,500.00
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款
149
广东省工商行政管理局
广东省
粤工商经处字〔2015〕第2号
2015-07-09
联合抵制交易
100,000.00
150
安徽省工商行政管理局
安徽省
皖工商公处字〔2015〕2号
2015-09-18
被调查的经营者、利害关系人或者其他有关单位或者个人应当配合反垄断执法机构依法履行职责，不得拒绝、阻碍反垄断执法机构的调查。
200,000.00
151
重庆市工商行政管理局
重庆市
渝工商经处字〔2015〕15号
2015-10-28
滥用市场支配地位 没有正当理由，拒绝与交易相对人进行交易
152
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2015〕1号
2015-11-03
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
30,000.00
153
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2015〕2号
2015-11-03
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
30,000.00
154
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2015〕3号
2015-11-03
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
30,000.00
155
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2015〕4号
2015-11-03
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
30,000.00
156
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2015〕6号
2015-11-03
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
30,000.00
157
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2015〕7号
2015-11-03
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
30,000.00
158
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2015〕2号
2015-12-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
23,980,869.00
处2014年度与中国市场相关的滚装货物国际海运服务销售额4％的罚款
159
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2015〕3号
2015-12-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
38,121,126.00
处2014年度与中国市场相关的滚装货物国际海运服务销售额7％的罚款
160
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2015〕4号
2015-12-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
284,731,338.00
处以2014年度与中国市场相关的滚装货物国际海运服务销售额9％的罚款
161
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2015〕5号
2015-12-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
45,061,269.00
处以2014年度与中国市场相关的滚装货物国际海运服务销售额8％的罚款
162
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2015〕6号
2015-12-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
3,076,680.00
处以2014年度与中国市场相关的滚装货物国际海运服务销售额6％的罚款
163
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2015〕7号
2015-12-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
11,268,578.00
处以2014年度与中国市场相关的滚装货物国际海运服务销售额5％的罚款
164
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2015〕8号
2015-12-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
1,198,354.00
处以2014年度与中国市场相关的滚装货物国际海运服务销售额4％的罚款
165
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔 2015 〕1号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
2,091,970.00
2013年共保销售额度（4183.94万元）的5%处以罚款
166
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔 2015 〕2号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
905,670.00
2013年共保销售额度（1811.34万元）的5%处以罚款
167
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔 2015 〕 3号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
682,389.00
2013年建工险共保销售额度（2274.63万元）的3%处以罚款
168
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔 2015 〕 4号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
471,888.00
2013年共保销售额度（1572.96万元）的3%处以罚款
169
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔 2015 〕5号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
259,707.00
2013年共保销售额度（865.69万元）的3%处以罚款
170
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕6号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
232,821.00
2013年共保销售额度（776.07万元）的3%处以罚款
171
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕 7号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
194,355.00
2013年共保销售额度（647.85万元）的3%处以罚款
172
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕8号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
165,738.00
2013年共保销售额度（552.46万元）的3%处以罚款
173
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕9号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
78,354.00
2013年共保销售额度（261.18万元）的3%处以罚款
174
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕10号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
17,811.00
2013年共保销售额度（59.37万元）的3%处以罚款
175
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕11号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
20,031.00
2013年共保销售额度（66.77万元）的3%处以罚款
176
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕12号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
20,031.00
2013年共保销售额度（66.77万元）的3%处以罚款
177
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕13号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
20,031.00
2013年共保销售额度（66.77万元）的3%处以罚款
178
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕14号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
19,146.00
2013年共保销售额度（63.82万元）的3%处以罚款
179
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕15号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
19,152.00
2013年共保销售额度（63.84万元）的3%处以罚款
180
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕16号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
13,212.00
2013年共保销售额度（44.04万元）的3%处以罚款
181
江西省工商行政管理局
江西省
赣工商公处字〔2015〕17 号
2015-12-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
5,934.00
2013年共保销售额度（19.78万元）的3%处以罚款
182
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2016〕1号
2016-01-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
1,805,200.00
2014年度别嘌醇片对外销售额2256.58万元8%的罚款
183
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2016〕2号
2016-01-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
1,184,100.00
处2014年度别嘌醇片销售额2368.17万元5%的罚款
184
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2016〕3号
2016-01-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
495,600.00
处2014年度别嘌醇片销售额991.33万元5%的罚款
185
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2016〕4号
2016-01-15
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
510,600.00
处2014年度别嘌醇片销售额1021.33万元5%的罚款
186
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第1号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
304,859.00
处以2013年度销售额10,161,965元3%的罚款
187
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第2号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
246,640.00
处以2013年度销售额8,221,330元3%的罚款
188
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第3号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
227,513.00
处以2013年度销售额7,583,775元3%的罚款
189
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第4号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
89,040.00
处以2013年度销售额2,967,995元3%的罚款
190
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第5号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
114,154.00
处以2013年度销售额3,805,145元3%的罚款
191
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第6号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
81,828.00
处以2013年度销售额2,727,594元3%的罚款
192
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第7号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
76,838.00
处以2013年度销售额2,561,250元3%的罚款
193
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第8号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
53,792.00
处以2013年度销售额2,689,623元2%的罚款
194
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第9号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
41,376.00
处以2013年度销售额2,068,800元2%的罚款
195
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第10号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
106,714.00
处以2013年度销售额5,335,715元2%的罚款
196
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第11号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
90,143.00
处以2013年度销售额4,507,130元2%的罚款
197
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第12号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
70,054.00
处以2013年度销售额3,502,700元2%的罚款
198
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第13号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
15,960.00
处以2013年度销售额797,989元2%的罚款
199
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第14号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
82,946.00
处以2013年度销售额4,147,300元2%的罚款
200
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第15号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
11,281.00
处以2013年度销售额564,040元2%的罚款
201
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第16号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
94,355.00
处以2013年度销售额4,717,760元2%的罚款
202
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第17号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
28,018.00
处以2013年度销售额2,801,800元1%的罚款
203
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第18号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
47,430.00
处以2013年度销售额4,742,970元1%的罚款
204
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第19号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
59,893.00
处以2013年度销售额5,989,320元1%的罚款
205
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第20号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
33,374.00
处以2013年度销售额3,337,400元1%的罚款
206
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第21号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
26,262.00
处以2013年度销售额2,626,150元1%的罚款
207
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第22号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
57,703.00
处以2013年度销售额5,770,300元1%的罚款
208
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第23号
2016-03-21
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
22,492.00
处以2013年度销售额2,249,170元1%的罚款
209
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2016〕第24号
2016-03-21
没有正当理由搭售商品，或者在交易时附加其他不合理的交易条件
6,818,533.79
处以2013年度相关市场销售额3%的罚款
210
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520160001号
2016-04-12
限定向第三人转售商品的最低价格
2,175,200.00
处2014年度相关市场销售额2.1752亿元1%的罚款
211
湖北省工商行政管理局
湖北省
鄂工商处字〔2016〕201号
2016-05-06
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
200,000.00
212
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
[2016]7号
2016-07-22
固定或者变更商品价格
484,431.00
处当事人2015年度艾司唑仑片剂销售额16,147,691元人民币3%的罚款
213
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
[2016]6号
2016-07-22
固定或者变更商品价格
547,563.00
处当事人2015年度艾司唑仑片剂销售额21,902,501元人民币2%点五的罚款
214
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
[2016]5号
2016-07-22
固定或者变更商品价格
1,571,829.00
处当事人2015年度艾司唑仑片剂销售额22,454,700元人民币7%的罚款
215
上海市物价局
上海市
第 2520160009 号
2016-08-08
限定向第三人转售商品的最低价格
12,348,000.00
处上一年度相关销售额元3%的罚款
216
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
[2016]8号
2016-12-05
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
118,520,000.00
对当事人处2015年度中国境内市场涉案产品销售额4%的罚款
217
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520160027号
2016-12-19
限定向第三人转售商品的最低价格
201,756,059.72
处上一年度（2015年）相关销售额5,043,901,492.97元4%的罚款
218
河南省工商行政管理局
河南省
豫工商处字〔2016〕第11号
2016-12-19
分割销售市场或者原材料市场
598,468.31
处以上一年度销售额2%的罚款
219
河南省工商行政管理局
河南省
豫工商处字〔2016〕第12号
2016-12-19
分割销售市场或者原材料市场
15,013.39
处以上一年度销售额1%罚款
220
河南省工商行政管理局
河南省
豫工商处字〔2016〕第13号
2016-12-19
分割销售市场或者原材料市场
12,962.85
处以上一年度销售额1%罚款
221
河南省工商行政管理局
河南省
豫工商处字〔2016〕第14号
2016-12-19
分割销售市场或者原材料市场
16,987.98
处以上一年度销售额1%罚款
222
河南省工商行政管理局
河南省
豫工商处字〔2016〕第15号
2016-12-19
分割销售市场或者原材料市场
15,000.88
处以上一年度销售额1%罚款
223
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520160030号
2016-12-27
限定向第三人转售商品的最低价格
1,977,777.49
处上一年度（2015年度）通过经销商销售巴氏杀菌奶的相关销售额197777748.72元1%的罚款
224
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520160028号
2016-12-29
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
742,147.98
处上一年度（2014年度）相关销售额12369133元之6%的罚款
225
广东省发展和改革委员会
广东省
广东省发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书粤发改价监处〔2016〕60号
2016-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
342,191.56
处以2014年度销售额17,109,577.78元2%的罚款
226
广东省发展和改革委员会
广东省
广东省发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书粤发改价监处〔2016〕59号
2016-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
120,017.00
处以2014年度销售额6,000,850元2%的罚款
227
广东省发展和改革委员会
广东省
广东省发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书粤发改价监处〔2016〕58号
2016-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
76,613.00
处以2014年度销售额7,661,300元1%的罚款
228
广东省发展和改革委员会
广东省
广东省发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书粤发改价监处〔2016〕57号
2016-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
67,826.29
处以2014年度销售额6,782,628.70元1%的罚款
229
广东省发展和改革委员会
广东省
广东省发展和改革委员会行政处罚决定书粤发改价监处〔2016〕56号
2016-12-30
固定或者变更商品价格
47,529.57
处以2014年度销售额4,752,956.70元1%的罚款
230
江苏省工商行政管理局
江苏省
苏工商案字【2016】第00048号
2016-12-30
滥用市场支配地位 没有正当理由，限定交易相对人只能与其进行交易或者只能与其指定的经营者进行交易
25,050,000.00
处上一年度经营额5%的罚款
231
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕1号
2017-03-20
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
100,000.00
232
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕9号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
3,500.00
按永诚财产保险股份有限公司河池中心支公司2013年摩托车交强险保费销售额（702,00元）的5%处以罚款
233
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕3号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
134,760.00
2013年摩托车交强险保费销售额（2,695,178元）的5%处以罚款
234
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕2号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
172,400.00
2013年摩托车交强险销售额收入（3,448,558元）的5%处以罚款
235
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕4号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
66,000.00
2013年摩托车交强险保费销售额（1,319,560元）的5%处以罚款
236
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕5号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
42,329.00
2013年摩托车交强险保费销售额（846,984元）的5%处以罚款
237
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕6号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
20,000.00
2013年摩托车交强险保费销售额（415,920元）的5%处以罚款
238
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕7号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
12,500.00
2013年摩托车交强险保费销售额（251,401元）的5%处以罚款
239
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经处字〔2017〕8号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
9,400.00
2013年摩托车交强险保费销售额（187,240元）的5%处以罚款
240
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商处字〔2017〕10号
2017-03-20
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
4,300.00
2013年摩托车交强险保费销售额（85,960元）的5%处以罚款
241
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕1号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
320,200.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
242
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕2号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
234,000.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
243
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕3号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
684,200.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
244
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕4号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
552,800.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
245
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕5号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
149,200.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
246
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕6号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
2,078,700.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
247
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕7号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
941,400.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
248
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕8号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
141,500.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
249
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕9号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
145,600.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
250
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕10号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
316,700.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
251
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕11号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
129,900.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
252
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕12号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
450,500.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
253
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕13号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
373,200.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
254
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕14号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
424,700.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
255
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕15号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
268,400.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
256
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕16号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
172,800.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
257
浙江省物价局
浙江省
浙价检处〔2017〕17号
2017-05-11
固定或者变更商品价格
395,600.00
处2016年卷筒白板纸销售额1% 的罚款
258
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
京发改价格处罚[2017]53号
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
8,938.00
处当事人2015年度销售额297951元人民币3%的罚款
259
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为
350,000.00
260
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
29,833.00
处当事人2015年度销售额994466元人民币3%的罚款
261
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
52,073.00
处当事人2015年度销售额743900元人民币7%的罚款
262
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
40,885.00
处当事人2015年度销售额584077元人民币7%的罚款
263
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
580,505.00
处当事人2015年度销售额8292937元人民币7%的罚款
264
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
318,747.00
处当事人2015年度销售额4553532元人民币7%的罚款
265
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
134,767.00
处当事人2015年度销售额1925245元人民币7%的罚款
266
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
1,500.00
处当事人2015年度销售额30000元人民币5%的罚款
267
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
63,454.00
处当事人2015年度销售额1269087元人民币5%的罚款
268
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
20,733.00
处当事人2015年度销售额414664元人民币5%的罚款
269
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
50,634.00
处当事人2015年度销售额1012693元人民币5%的罚款
270
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
32,451.00
处当事人2015年度销售额1081730元人民币3%的罚款
271
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
2,865.00
处当事人2015年度销售额95526元人民币3%的罚款
272
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
11,320.00
处当事人2015年度销售额377364元人民币3%的罚款
273
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
11,412.00
处当事人2015年度销售额380432元人民币3%的罚款
274
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
8,016.00
处当事人2015年度销售额267233元人民币3%的罚款
275
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
1,995.00
处当事人2015年度销售额66500元人民币3%的罚款
276
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
14,970.00
处当事人2015年度销售额499029元人民币3%的罚款
277
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
11,940.00
处当事人2015年度销售额398027元人民币3%的罚款
278
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
24,347.00
处当事人2015年度销售额811590元人民币3%的罚款
279
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
12,522.00
处当事人2015年度销售额417426元人民币3%的罚款
280
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
7,189.00
处当事人2015年度销售额239659元人民币3%的罚款
281
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
23,215.00
处当事人2015年度销售额773834元人民币3%的罚款
282
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
4,529.00
处当事人2015年度销售额150977元人民币3%的罚款
283
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
18,099.00
处当事人2015年度销售额603304元人民币3%的罚款
284
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
6,669.00
处当事人2015年度销售额222303元人民币3%的罚款
285
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
5,777.00
处当事人2015年度销售额192576元人民币3%的罚款
286
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
4,644.00
处当事人2015年度销售额154823元人民币3%的罚款
287
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
11,694.00
处当事人2015年度销售额389805元人民币3%的罚款
288
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
11,189.00
处当事人2015年度销售额372970元人民币3%的罚款
289
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
16,149.00
处当事人2015年度销售额538326元人民币3%的罚款
290
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
5,851.00
处当事人2015年度销售额195036元人民币3%的罚款
291
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
37,895.00
处当事人2015年度销售额1263194元人民币3%的罚款
292
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
13,553.00
处当事人2015年度销售额451773元人民币3%的罚款
293
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
4,380.00
处当事人2015年度销售额146000元人民币3%的罚款
294
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
5,481.00
处当事人2015年度销售额182718元人民币3%的罚款
295
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
9,687.00
处当事人2015年度销售额322900元人民币3%的罚款
296
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
5,453.00
处当事人2015年度销售额181786元人民币3%的罚款
297
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
3,786.00
处当事人2015年度销售额126213元人民币3%的罚款
298
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
14,036.00
处当事人2015年度销售额467883元人民币3%的罚款
299
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
15,371.00
处当事人2015年度销售额512388元人民币3%的罚款
300
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
21,611.00
处当事人2015年度销售额720388元人民币3%的罚款
301
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
9,305.00
处当事人2015年度销售额310194元人民币3%的罚款
302
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
4,331.00
处当事人2015年度销售额144368元人民币3%的罚款
303
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
57,305.00
处当事人2015年度销售额1910194元人民币3%的罚款
304
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
22,562.00
处当事人2015年度销售额752090元人民币3%的罚款
305
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
7,163.00
处当事人2015年度销售额238792元人民币3%的罚款
306
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
2017-05-26
固定或者变更商品价格
59,906.00
处当事人2015年度销售额1996894元人民币3%的罚款
307
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕3号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
52,619,800.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额二十六亿三千零九十九万元2%的罚款
308
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕4号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
33,032,800.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额十六亿五千一百六十四万元2%的罚款
309
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕5号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
20,609,800.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额二十亿六千零九十八万元1%的罚款
310
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕6号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
29,478,000.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额二十九亿四千七百八十万元1%的罚款
311
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕7号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
19,375,500.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额十九亿三千七百五十五万元1%的罚款
312
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕8号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
9,264,400.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额九亿二千六百四十四万元1%的罚款
313
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕9号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
14,431,300.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额十四亿四千三百一十三万元1%的罚款
314
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕10号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
45,285,700.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额四十五亿二千八百五十七万元1%的罚款
315
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕11号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
7,114,500.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额七十一亿一千一百四十五万元1%的罚款
316
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕12号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
7,915,500.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额七亿九千一百五十五万元1%的罚款
317
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕13号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
8,402,500.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额八亿四千零二十五万元1%的罚款
318
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕14号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
10,214,000.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额十亿二千一百四十万元1%的罚款
319
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕15号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
16,018,100.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额十六亿零一百八十一万元1%的罚款
320
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕16号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
20,226,600.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额二十亿二千二百六十六万元1%的罚款
321
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕17号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
16,536,600.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额十六亿五千三百六十六万元1%的罚款
322
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕18号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
51,320,700.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额五十一亿三千二百零七万元1%的罚款
323
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕19号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
15,170,600.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额十五亿一千七百三十六万元1%的罚款
324
国家发展和改革委员会
全国
〔2017〕20号
2017-09-25
固定或者变更商品价格
16,330,300.00
处以二〇一六年度相关市场销售额十六亿三千三百零三万元1%的罚款
325
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2017〕1号
2017-09-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
748,771.40
处当事人在长沙市范围内2016年度37,438,569.75元销售收入 的2%罚款
326
湖南省工商行政管理局
湖南省
湘工商竞处字〔2017〕2号
2017-09-28
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
374,850.93
处当事人在长沙市范围内2016年度37,485,093.21元销售收入的 1%罚款
327
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520170032号
2017-12-27
固定向第三人转售商品的价格
2,369,957.15
处上一年度相关销售额 47,399,143元5%的罚款
328
上海市物价局
上海市
第2520170031号
2017-12-27
固定向第三人转售商品价格、限定向第三人转售商品最低价格
2,305,559.79
处上一年度相关销售额76,851,993元3%的罚款
329
安徽省工商行政管理局
安徽省
皖工商竞争处字〔2017〕1号
2017-12-29
联合抵制交易
100,000.00
330
北京市发展和改革委员会
北京市
京发改价格处罚[2017]84号
2017-12-29
固定或者变更商品价格
500,000.00
331
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2018〕第1号
2018-03-21
联合抵制交易
600,000.00
332
山东省工商行政管理局
山东省
鲁工商公处字〔2018〕第2号
2018-05-07
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
413,526.00
处以 2013年度统筹
333
国家市场监督管理总局
全国
国市监价监处罚〔2018〕1号
2018-06-11
固定或者变更商品价格
5,753,549.00
处上一年度相关销售额4%的罚款
334
国家市场监督管理总局
全国
国市监价监处罚〔2018〕2号
2018-06-11
固定或者变更商品价格
3,967,237.00
处上一年度相关销售额4%的罚款
335
国家市场监督管理总局
全国
国市监价监处罚〔2018〕3号
2018-06-11
固定或者变更商品价格
2,447,201.00
处上一年度相关销售额4%的罚款
336
国家市场监督管理总局
全国
国市监价监处罚〔2018〕4号
2018-06-11
固定或者变更商品价格
689,651.00
处上一年度相关销售额4%的罚款
337
国家市场监督管理总局
全国
国市监价监处罚〔2018〕5号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
2,014,056.00
处上一年度相关销售额4%的罚款
338
国家市场监督管理总局
全国
国市监价监处罚〔2018〕6号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
1,149,052.00
处上一年度相关销售额4%的罚款
339
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕16号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
8,367.90
处2016年度相关市场销售额836795.14元1%的罚款
340
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕15号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
11,960.30
处2016年度相关市场销售额1196034.75元1%的罚款
341
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕14号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
42,839.50
处2016年度相关市场销售额4283946.69元1%的罚款
342
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕13号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
6,804.00
处2016年度相关市场销售额340203.99元2%的罚款
343
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕12号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
28,246.40
处2016年度相关市场销售额1412321.33元2%的罚款
344
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕11号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
57,273.50
处2016年度相关市场销售额2863676.49元2%的罚款
345
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕10号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
38,505.10
处2016年度相关市场销售额1283502.24元3%的罚款
346
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕9号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
25,206.00
处2016年度相关市场销售额630149.79元4%的罚款
347
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕8号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
10,237.00
处2016年度相关市场销售额255925.15元4%的罚款
348
广西壮族自治区物价局
广西壮族自治区
广西壮族自治区物价局行政处罚决定书〔2018〕17号
2018-07-09
固定或者变更商品价格
18,745.60
处2016年度相关市场销售额1874563.11元1%的罚款
349
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经检处字〔2018〕1号
2018-07-25
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
39,920.00
处2014年度烟花爆竹销售额（79.84万元）5%的罚款
350
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经检处字〔2018〕2号
2018-07-25
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
51,500.00
处2014年度烟花爆竹销售额（64.3755万元）8%的罚款
351
广西壮族自治区工商行政管理局
广西壮族自治区
桂工商经检处字〔2018〕3号
2018-07-25
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场
22,586.00
处2014年度烟花爆竹销售额（28.2325万元）8%的罚款
352
广东省发展和改革委员会
广东省
粤发改价监处〔2018〕4号
2018-08-14
固定或者变更商品价格
1,554,468.06
处上一年度销售额1% 的罚款
353
广东省发展和改革委员会
广东省
粤发改价监处〔2018〕5号
2018-08-14
固定或者变更商品价格
293,103.61
处上一年度销售额1% 的罚款
354
广东省发展和改革委员会
广东省
粤发改价监处〔2018〕6号
2018-08-14
分割销售市场
150,000.00
355
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕69号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
2,806,910.83
处上一年度销售额5%的罚款
356
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕70号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
812,008.00
处上一年度销售额5%的罚款
357
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕71号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
1,927,721.70
处上一年度销售额3%的罚款
358
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕72号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
12,196,295.01
处上一年度销售额3%的罚款
359
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕73号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
3,548,426.53
处上一年度销售额2.5%的罚款
360
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕74号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
2,654,893.00
处上一年度销售额3%的罚款
361
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕75号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
2,105,023.68
处上一年度销售额3%的罚款
362
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕76号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
2,606,989.22
处上一年度销售额3%的罚款
363
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕77号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
47,129.72
处上一年度销售额2%的罚款
364
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕78号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
1,140,934.56
处上一年度销售额3%的罚款
365
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕79号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
6,727,564.90
处上一年度销售额3%的罚款
366
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕80号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
924,189.15
处上一年度销售额2%的罚款
367
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕81号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
1,887,312.93
处上一年度销售额2%的罚款
368
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕82号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
931,937.10
处上一年度销售额2%的罚款
369
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕83号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
1,756,206.53
处上一年度销售额2%的罚款
370
天津市发展和改革委员会
天津市
津发改价检处〔2018〕84号
2018-11-16
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议
3,038,169.88
处上一年度销售额2%的罚款
小计
3,695,390,204.79
(1)Regarding the authorization mechanism.In order to establish a unified,open,and orderly competitive market system throughout the country,Article 3 of the Regulations clearly stipulates that the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration is responsible for the enforcement of antitrust agreements;The General Administration of Market Supervision authorizes the market supervision and administration departments of various provinces,autonomous regions,and municipalities directly under the Central Government(including the General Administration of Market Supervision and provincial market supervision departments)to be responsible for the antitrust law enforcement work of monopoly agreements within their respective administrative regions;Article 4 lists the types of suspected monopolistic agreement behaviors that the General Administration of Market Supervision can directly investigate or designate relevant provincial market supervision departments to investigate.In this way,the antimonopoly law enforcement is taken as the central authority,and the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration is uniformly responsible for it;At the same time,in order to facilitate strict and unified law enforcement,it is also stipulated that the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration may authorize corresponding institutions of provincial governments to be responsible for antitrust law enforcement,but corresponding filing and reporting systems should be established.
(2)Determination of monopoly agreements.Article 5 of the Regulations clearly states:"A monopoly agreement refers to an agreement,decision,or other collaborative action that excludes or restricts competition.The agreement or decision can be in writing,oral,or other forms.Other collaborative actions refer to actions between operators with competitive relationships that are not explicitly negotiated or decided,but that are in essence coordinated and consistent."It can be seen that the Regulations,in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II"Monopoly Agreement"of the Anti monopoly Law,There is no longer a distinction between price and non price monopoly agreement cases,and the seven specific forms of monopoly agreements listed in Articles 13 and 14 of the Anti monopoly Law,such as fixed price changes and restrictions on production and sales quantities,have been further elaborated.For other monopoly agreements that are identified by the antimonopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council under the Anti Monopoly Law,the Provisions also clarify the specific considerations for the identification of the antimonopoly law enforcement agency,improving the legal certainty.The detailed regulations are as follows:
1.For the determination of"collaborative behavior",Article 6 of the Regulations stipulates that the following factors should be considered:(1)Whether the market behavior of operators is consistent;(2)Whether there has been any intention communication or information exchange between operators;(3)Can the operator provide a reasonable explanation for the consistency of behavior.When identifying other collaborative behaviors,consideration should also be given to the structure,competition,market changes,and industry conditions of the relevant market.
2.Regarding horizontal monopoly agreements,Article 7 of the Regulations lists other fees that prohibit competitive operators from entering into agreements on the price of goods or services:(1)fixing or changing the price level,the range of price changes,or fees,discounts,and other fees that have an impact on prices;(2)Agree on the standard formula used to calculate the price;(3)Restricting the autonomous pricing rights of operators participating in the agreement;(4)A monopoly agreement that fixes or changes prices by other means.
3.Article 8 of the Regulations explicitly prohibits competitive business operators from entering into the following monopoly agreements to limit the production or sales volume of goods:(1)restricting the production volume of goods or restricting the production volume of specific types and models of goods by restricting production,fixing production,or stopping production;(2)Limiting the sales quantity of a commodity or restricting the sales quantity of a specific variety or model of a commodity by refusing to supply or restricting the quantity of goods placed;(3)Limiting the production or sales quantity of goods by other means.
4.Article 9 of the Regulations explicitly prohibits competitive operators from reaching agreements on dividing the sales market or raw material procurement market(1)dividing the sales territory,market share,sales targets,sales revenue,or the type,quantity,and time of sales of goods;(2)Divide the procurement areas,types,quantities,and suppliers of raw materials such as raw materials,semi-finished products,components,and related equipment;(3)A monopoly agreement that divides the sales market or raw material procurement market by other means.
5.Article 10 of the Regulations explicitly prohibits competitive business operators from reaching agreements on restricting the purchase of new technologies,new equipment,or the development of new technologies and new products(1)restricting the purchase and use of new technologies and new processes;(2)Restrict the purchase,lease,and use of new equipment;(3)Restricting investment,developing new technologies,processes,and products;(4)Refusing to use new technologies,processes,equipment,or products;(5)Monopoly agreements that restrict the purchase of new technologies or equipment or restrict the development of new technologies or products through other means.
6.Article 11 of the Regulations explicitly prohibits competitive business operators from entering into boycott transactions
(1)jointly refusing to supply or sell goods to specific business operators;(2)Jointly refusing to purchase or sell the goods of specific operators;(3)Jointly restricting specific operators from conducting transactions with operators that have a competitive relationship with them;(4)Monopoly agreements that boycott transactions through other means.
7.Article 12 of the Regulations explicitly prohibits business operators and trading counterparties from reaching agreements on commodity prices(1)to fix the price level,price fluctuation,or other fees that may affect prices for resale to third parties,such as fees,discounts,etc;(2)Limiting the minimum price for resale of goods to third parties;(3)A monopoly agreement that fixes the price of resale goods or limits the minimum price of resale goods by other means.
8.Any other agreement,agreement,or collaborative act that does not fall within the circumstances listed in Articles 7 to 12 of the Regulations and that has evidence to prove exclusion or restriction of competition shall be recognized as a monopoly agreement and prohibited.The State Administration of Market Supervision shall be responsible for determining the monopoly agreement specified in the preceding paragraph,and the following factors shall be taken into account when determining:(1)the fact that the operator has reached and implemented the agreement;(2)Market competition;(3)The market share of the operator in the relevant market and its ability to control the market;(4)The impact of the agreement on commodity prices,quality,and other aspects;(5)The impact of the agreement on market entry and technological progress;(6)The impact of the agreement on consumers and other relevant business operators;(7)Other factors that the General Administration of Market Supervision believes should be considered.
9.Industry associations usually act as organizers of monopoly agreements involved in cases,playing an organizing,leading,or leading role,and playing a key role in the process of organizing,concluding,and implementing monopoly agreements involved in cases.Therefore,Article 16 of the Regulations clearly prohibits industry associations from organizing their operators to engage in monopolistic agreement behaviors prohibited by the Regulations in the following ways:(1)formulating and issuing industry association bylaws,rules,decisions,notices,standards,etc.that contain exclusions and restrictions on competition;(2)Convene,organize,or promote operators in the industry to reach agreements,resolutions,minutes,memorandums,etc.that contain exclusions or restrictions on competition;(3)Other monopolistic agreement behaviors prohibited by these regulations.
Section 3 Ten Year Review of Monopoly Agreement Enforcement Cases
1、Statistics of administrative penalty cases
(1)Statistics of administrative penalty cases with fines
相关业务销售额1%的罚款
(2)Statistics of administrative penalty cases where fines are imposed and illegal income is confiscated
|
序号 |
案例标题 |
处罚机构 |
地域 |
案号 |
处罚时间 |
性质 |
没收违法所得（单位：元） |
罚款金额（单位：元） |
罚款比例 |
|
1 |
江苏省工商行政管理局 |
江苏省 |
苏工商案字【2010】第00038号 |
2010-08-31 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
26,896.08 |
78,248.34 |
|
|
|
2 |
江苏省工商行政管理局 |
江苏省 |
苏工商案字【2010】第00039号 |
2010-08-31 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
24,247.83 |
97,933.87 |
|
|
|
3 |
江苏省工商行政管理局 |
江苏省 |
苏工商案字【2010】第00040号 |
2010-08-31 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
18,993.83 |
46,226.95 |
|
|
|
4 |
江苏省工商行政管理局 |
江苏省 |
苏工商案字【2010】第00041号 |
2010-08-31 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
30,357.91 |
185,260.54 |
|
|
|
5 |
江苏省工商行政管理局 |
江苏省 |
苏工商案字【2010】第00042号 |
2010-08-31 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
35,985.56 |
123,053.49 |
|
|
|
6 |
江西省工商行政管理局 |
江西省 |
赣工商公处字[2010]01号 |
2011-04-01 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
205,537.00 |
130,230.00 |
|
|
|
7 |
河南省工商行政管理局 |
河南省 |
豫工商处字〔2012〕第001号 |
2012-01-04 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
1,468,202.08 |
264,920.37 |
|
|
|
8 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3001号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
914,000.00 |
65,300.00 |
处以上一年度销售额108.90万元6%的罚款 |
|
|
9 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3002号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
433,200.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
10 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3003号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
433,200.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
11 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3004号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
433,200.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
12 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3005号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
433,200.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
13 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3006号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
433,200.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
14 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3007号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
433,200.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
15 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3008号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
259,900.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
16 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3009号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
130,000.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
17 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3010号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
117,700.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
18 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2015〕3011号 |
2015-06-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
420,100.00 |
14,500.00 |
处以上一年度销售额72.6万元2%的罚款 |
|
|
19 |
安徽省工商行政管理局 |
安徽省 |
皖工商公处字〔2016〕1号 |
2016-09-18 |
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量 |
19,854,770.81 |
75,913.85 |
处以2014年度销售额百分之八的罚款 |
|
|
20 |
安徽省工商行政管理局 |
安徽省 |
皖工商公处字〔2016〕2 号 |
2016-09-18 |
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量 |
4,113,690.09 |
76,170.94 |
处以2014年度销售额8%的罚款 |
|
|
21 |
安徽省工商行政管理局 |
安徽省 |
皖工商公处字〔2016〕3号 |
2016-09-18 |
限制商品的生产数量或者销售数量 |
5,380,259.16 |
258,502.50 |
处以2014年度销售额8%的罚款 |
|
|
22 |
重庆市工商行政管理局 |
重庆市 |
渝工商经处字〔2016〕15号 |
2016-11-24 |
滥用市场支配地位 没有正当理由，拒绝与交易相对人进行交易 |
482,883.90 |
17,240.00 |
处2015年度销售收入1%的罚款 |
|
|
23 |
湖北省工商行政管理局 |
湖北省 |
鄂工商处字〔2017〕201号 |
2017-01-11 |
联合抵制交易 |
1,836,900.00 |
372,321.00 |
处以 2015 年度，当事人及其通过其他 3 家公司名义销售水杨酸甲酯原料药的总销售额 1241.07 万元 3%的罚款 |
|
|
24 |
河南省工商行政管理局 |
河南省 |
豫工商处字[2018]第2号 |
2018-10-22 |
分割销售市场或者原材料市场 |
160,199.18 |
414,245.16 |
处以2016年度经营额7%的罚款 |
|
|
25 |
河南省工商行政管理局 |
河南省 |
豫工商处字[2018]第3号 |
2018-10-22 |
分割销售市场或者原材料市场 |
131,145.79 |
218,998.02 |
处以2016年度经营额6%的罚款 |
|
|
26 |
河南省工商行政管理局 |
河南省 |
豫工商处字[2018]第4号 |
2018-10-22 |
分割销售市场或者原材料市场 |
59,032.24 |
74,752.86 |
处以2016年度经营额6%的罚款 |
|
|
小计 |
38,270,001.46 |
2,644,317.89 |
|
||||||
(3)Statistics of administrative penalty cases for suspending or terminating investigations
(4)Statistics of administrative penalty cases exempted from punishment
|
序号 |
案例标题 |
处罚机构 |
地域 |
案号 |
处罚时间 |
性质 |
行政处罚决定 |
|
1 |
国家发展和改革委员会 |
全国 |
发改办价监处罚[2014]10号 |
2014-08-15 |
固定或者变更商品价格 |
免于处罚 |
|
|
2 |
国家发展和改革委员会 |
全国 |
发改办价监处罚[2014]2号 |
2014-08-15 |
|
免于处罚 |
|
|
3 |
湖南省工商行政管理局 |
湖南省 |
湘工商竞处字〔2015〕5号 |
2015-11-03 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
免于处罚 |
|
|
4 |
国家发展和改革委员会 |
全国 |
〔2015〕1 号 |
2015-12-15 |
分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场 |
免于处罚 |
|
|
5 |
天津市发展和改革委员会 |
天津市 |
津发改价检处〔2018〕85号 |
2018-11-16 |
固定或者变更商品价格垄断协议 |
免于处罚 |
2、Statistics of civil litigation cases
4、Equal enforcement of monopoly agreements and the court's determination criteria for related issues
(1)The enforcement of monopoly agreements treats all types of market entities equally and equally.
The antimonopoly law protects and maintains fair competition in the market,and all types of market entities are equal before the law.Therefore,the antimonopoly law and its supporting provisions treat all types of market entities equally and apply equally,and there is no problem of selective law enforcement.If market entities commit acts that violate the anti monopoly law,they should be investigated by the anti monopoly law enforcement agencies and bear corresponding legal responsibilities.On the tenth anniversary of the implementation of the Anti monopoly Law,most monopoly agreement cases originate from reports and complaints,and there is no problem of selective enforcement by anti monopoly law enforcement agencies.From the published administrative penalty decisions,the nature of the punished enterprises includes both domestic and foreign-funded enterprises,and domestic enterprises account for the majority.
Monopoly agreement cases involve a wide range of regions and fields,including Beijing,Shanghai,Shanxi,Shaanxi,Zhejiang,Henan,Hunan,Xinjiang,Ningxia,Hebei,Anhui,Sichuan,Guangxi,Guizhou,Jiangsu,Guangdong,Shandong,and other provinces and cities across the country.The monopoly agreement cases also involve a wide range of industries,including the insurance industry,motor vehicle testing industry,electric power industry,PVC industry,paper industry,mobile phone industry,natural gas,automotive components,logistics,motor vehicle driving school training institutions,fireworks,river sand mining,accounting firms,tallying,pharmaceutical raw materials,and other fields.
In the future,the anti monopoly law enforcement agencies will continue to investigate and handle monopoly agreement cases in accordance with the law,and will treat all types of market entities equally regardless of their nature,industry,and scale.
(2)The determination of relevant issues in civil disputes over monopoly agreements has far-reaching significance.
1.The determination of monopoly agreements in civil disputes should take the elimination and restriction of competitive effects as a necessary element.
In the judgment of Ruibang v.Johnson&Johnson,the first vertical monopoly agreement case in China,the Shanghai High Court clearly stated that the agreement to limit the minimum resale price stipulated in Article 14 of the Anti monopoly Law must have the effect of eliminating and restricting competition in order to be recognized as a monopoly agreement.
Firstly,the definition of monopoly agreements in Article 13 of the Anti monopoly Law applies to the provisions of vertical monopoly agreements in Article 14.After listing six types of horizontal monopoly agreements,Article 13 of the Anti monopoly Law stipulates that"monopoly agreements referred to in this Law refer to agreements,decisions,or other collaborative actions that exclude or restrict competition.".After reading through all the provisions of the Anti Monopoly Law,it can be found that there are four sentence expressions in this law,namely,"The operator referred to in this law refers to..."in Article 12,"The relevant market referred to in this law refers to..."in Article 12,and"The monopoly agreement referred to in this law refers to..."in Article 13,"The term"dominant market position"as used in this Law refers to...".Obviously,these expressions clearly define relevant terms within the scope of"this Law",and logically should not only apply to one provision but should apply to the entire law.Otherwise,it is obviously unreasonable to redefine these terms in every other provision that contains the words"operator","relevant market","monopoly agreement",and"market dominance".Therefore,the definition of monopoly agreements in Article 13 is also applicable to the provisions of vertical restriction agreements in Article 14.
Secondly,Article 7 of the Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Trial of Monopoly Disputes stipulates:"If the accused monopolistic act belongs to a monopoly agreement specified in Article 13,Paragraph 1,Items(1)to(5)of the Anti monopoly Law,the defendant shall bear the burden of proof that the agreement does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition."Based on this,it can be seen that determining that a horizontal agreement specified in Article 13 of the Anti monopoly Law constitutes a monopoly agreement should be based on the fact that the agreement has the effect of excluding Restricting competition effects is a prerequisite.It is generally believed that because horizontal agreements directly exclude and restrict market competition,the effect of horizontal agreements on restricting competition is greater than that of vertical agreements.The weight should be taken lightly,and horizontal agreements with strong anti-competitive effects must have the effect of eliminating and restricting competition as a necessary condition for forming monopoly agreements.Vertical agreements with relatively weak anti-competitive effects should also have the effect of eliminating and restricting competition as a necessary condition.
2.The plaintiff bears the burden of proof as to whether the vertical monopoly agreement has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.
In the judgment of Ruibang v.Johnson&Johnson,the first vertical monopoly agreement case in China,the Shanghai High Court clearly pointed out that because the effect of vertical agreements on restricting competition is generally not as obvious as that of horizontal agreements(agreements that restrict prices,quantities,and regions in horizontal agreements are often difficult to prove not to have the effect of excluding or restricting competition),Therefore,the burden of proof for the anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements cannot be inferred from the provisions of Article 7 of the"Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Trial of Monopoly Disputes".In the absence of clear provisions in laws,regulations,and judicial interpretations,the principle of"who claims,who adduces evidence"in civil litigation should be followed,and the plaintiff should bear the burden of proof for the exclusionary and restrictive competitive effects of the minimum resale price agreement in this case.Specifically,when filing a lawsuit against a minimum resale price agreement in accordance with Article 14 of the Anti monopoly Law,the plaintiff should first prove the existence of the minimum resale price agreement,and then provide evidence on the possibility that the defendant's restriction of the minimum resale price agreement may harm market competition,such as insufficient market competition,the defendant's strong market position,and the defendant's behavioral motivation to restrict competition;When the plaintiff has completed the preliminary proof,the defendant shall submit rebuttal evidence to prove that the plaintiff's evidence is not conclusive,or that the defendant's agreement to limit the minimum resale price does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition,the defendant's agreement to limit the minimum resale price has the obvious effect of promoting competition,and there is no significant impairment of consumer welfare,which can be contested according to law.
Coincidentally,in the second instance civil judgment of the first vertical monopoly agreement dispute case in Guangdong Province-Dongguan Hengli Guochang Electrical Appliance Store and Dongguan Shengshi Xinxing Gree Trading Co.,Ltd.-the court held the same view on the distribution of the burden of proof on whether the vertical monopoly agreement has the effect of eliminating and restricting competition,Clarification:In principle,in the absence of clear provisions in laws,regulations,and judicial interpretations,the principle of"who claims,who provides evidence"in the Civil Procedure Law should be followed in determining whether an agreement limiting the minimum resale price has the burden of proof to exclude and limit the effects of competition.However,considering that the plaintiff's ability to provide evidence is limited,and that vertical monopoly cases involve the regulation of market competition order,which is related to social and public interests,When hearing cases involving vertical monopoly agreements,the people's court should not be in a passive position on the issue of proof as in ordinary civil cases,but can take the initiative to obtain evidence ex officio according to the needs of the case.However,if relevant evidence cannot be collected after the plaintiff adduces evidence and the court retrieves evidence,the legal consequences of failing to provide evidence should still be borne by the plaintiff.
2.Analyze the four indicators of the anti-competitive effect of fixed resale price agreements.
In the judgment of the Shanghai High Court in the first vertical monopoly agreement case in China-Ruibang v.Johnson&Johnson(hereinafter referred to as"the case"),in its analysis and judgment of the nature of the behavior of restricting the minimum resale price,four aspects are the most important considerations:whether the relevant market competition is sufficient,whether the defendant's market position is strong,the defendant's motivation to implement the restriction on the minimum resale price,and the competitive effect of restricting the minimum resale price,It is also a basic method for courts to analyze and evaluate actions that limit the minimum resale price.The specific evaluation is as follows:
(1)Whether the competition in the relevant market is sufficient The court believes that insufficient competition in the relevant market should be the primary condition for determining that the minimum resale price agreement in the case constitutes a monopoly agreement.Only when it is determined that the relevant market lacks sufficient competition,it is necessary to further determine the competitive effect of the agreement suspected of monopoly.In a fully competitive market,consumers have sufficient choices when purchasing goods.A company that limits the minimum resale price for some reason may reduce consumers'purchase of this product,but it will not hinder consumers'other alternative choices,and economic efficiency and consumer interests are not compromised.In a market with insufficient competition,due to the lack of sufficient alternative options,users rely on products of a certain brand or several brands,and apply a minimum price limit on a certain brand product.This not only leads to the loss of price competition for products within the brand,but also may form a tacit understanding of pricing between different brand products,or although there is no tacit understanding,it may result in a lack of motivation for price competition,Leading to market prices rising or maintaining a high level,resulting in economic efficiency and consumer benefits being damaged.Therefore,under the premise of insufficient competition in the relevant market,it is possible to further analyze the impact of restricting the minimum resale price on market competition.As for judging whether the competition in the relevant market is sufficient,the Court believes that not only the concentration of the market should be considered,but also various factors that affect the degree of competition in the relevant market,such as the substitutability of the product involved,the difficulty of potential competitors entering the relevant market,and the competitiveness of the downstream market.
(2)"Does the defendant have a strong market position in the relevant market involved in the case?The court held that the enterprise implementing the minimum resale price restriction has a strong market position in the relevant market and can have an impact on market competition,which should be an important condition for limiting the minimum resale price agreement to constitute a monopoly agreement.".The market position of an enterprise is the basis for its pricing behavior to affect market competition.An enterprise lacking market position in a relevant market can usually only adapt to market competition,but is unable to influence competition,let alone dominate competition."If the defendant does not have any advantages in terms of market share,raw material supply,key technologies,sales channels,brand image,etc.,then the defendant does not have the power to affect market competition,and its actions to limit the minimum resale price will not affect market competition,or although it affects competition in a short time and in a small range,it will soon be corrected by more efficient market competition.".In short,there will be no effect of eliminating or restricting competition that should be eliminated through antitrust law enforcement.Therefore,the defendant has a strong market position,which should be the premise and basis for determining that the defendant's behavior of limiting the minimum resale price has the effect of eliminating and restricting competition.As for the extent to which the defendant's market position is"very strong",it is only possible that its behavior of limiting the minimum resale price is a monopoly agreement that excludes and restricts competition.The court held that the market position of an enterprise is mainly reflected in its pricing power.If an enterprise has strong pricing power and has an absolute advantage in pricing negotiations with buyers,the enterprise can calmly and freely price without having to follow market prices.On the contrary,the pricing of other enterprises in the relevant market may be affected by the pricing power of the enterprise,The enterprise should be considered to have a strong market position that affects market competition.
(3)Motivation for Restricting the Minimum Resale Price The Court believes that the motivation for restricting the minimum resale price should be taken as an important factor in determining whether the act can have a restrictive competitive effect.Although behavioral motivation and behavioral effects do not completely correspond,and behavioral motivation is difficult to observe,if an enterprise with a strong market position restricts the minimum resale price due to its motivation to restrict market competition,due to its dominance in financial resources,technology,information,and other aspects,and its ability to control upstream and downstream is often strong,the likelihood of restricting the minimum resale price behavior having restrictive competitive effects will indeed greatly increase.Therefore,although the motivation to restrict competition cannot be considered as a necessary condition for determining that a minimum resale price agreement has the effect of excluding or restricting competition and constitutes a monopoly agreement,it can still be considered as an important reference factor in determining the nature of a minimum resale price agreement.
(4)The court held that restricting the minimum resale price agreement may promote competition as well as restrict competition.On the one hand,due to the existence of certain self-healing functions in the market,some effects of restricting competition will soon be corrected by the market,and on the other hand,some effects of restricting competition will be offset by other effects of promoting competition.Therefore,an agreement to limit the minimum resale price should only be recognized as a monopoly agreement when it actually produces insurmountable and difficult to offset restrictive competitive effects.Therefore,when analyzing and evaluating the competitive effects of restricting the minimum resale price,special attention should be paid to those effects that have a substantial impact on market competition.The court held that although limiting the minimum resale price is considered to have restrictive competitive effects such as restricting intra brand price competition,restricting dealer pricing freedom,facilitating price cartels,and causing excessive advertising and services,the so-called uneconomic issues such as excessive advertising and services can be corrected by the market itself Restrictions on inter brand price competition(including restrictions on intra brand and inter brand price competition due to restrictions on dealers'free pricing and promotion of price cartels)are the substantive impacts on market competition.
Comprehensively judge whether the minimum resale price agreement has the effect of restricting competition from the following aspects:First,eliminate intra brand competition and maintain a high price level for a long time.Second,avoiding price competition between brands reduces price competition in relevant markets.Limiting the minimum resale price not only directly restricts price competition within the brand,but also has a negative impact on the price mechanism in the relevant market.Third,restrict dealers'pricing freedom and crowd out efficient dealers.
Based on the case evidence,it is comprehensively judged whether the minimum resale price agreement has a significant competitive effect:first,whether it is sufficient to prove the existence of the effect of promoting product quality and safety.Secondly,whether it is sufficient to prove the necessity of solving the dealer's"free rider"problem.Thirdly,is it sufficient to prove the necessity of promoting new brands and products to enter relevant markets.Fourth,whether it is sufficient to prove that the minimum resale price agreement in this case has other competitive effects.
3.The criteria for determining compensation for damages.
In the judgment of Ruibang v.Johnson&Johnson,the first vertical monopoly agreement case in China,the Shanghai High Court conducted a detailed analysis and reasoning on the damages claimed by the appellant,and made it clear that:(1)compensation for product profit losses has a claim basis in the antitrust law,and there is a direct causal relationship with the appellant's implementation of the minimum resale price agreement,so this loss can be claimed for compensation;However,compensation for loss of product profits should not be calculated in accordance with the rules of the contract law(that is,the loss should not be calculated in accordance with the available profits that limit the minimum resale price),but should be calculated with reference to the normal profits of the relevant market;When analyzing the normal profit margins of distributors in relevant markets,the appellant's losses will be determined by reference to the price differences between the prices of relevant products produced by the appellee and other brand-related products,dealer purchase discounts,tax burdens,and profit distribution between the appellee and distributors;(2)Claims for compensation for other losses,such as loss of profits from unrelated products,loss of high-priced purchases,loss of profits that can be expected,loss of goodwill,employee severance,loss of overstocked inventory,and loss of promotional expenses,are not supported due to lack of legal basis.
4.Administrative penalties in anti monopoly law enforcement need not be made on the premise of having the effect of eliminating and restricting competition,let alone causing losses to others.
The Hainan Provincial Higher People's Court made it clear in the second instance administrative judgment on administrative penalties issued by the Hainan Provincial Price Bureau and Hainan Yutai Technology Feed Co.,Ltd.that in order to achieve the legislative purpose of China's antitrust law to prevent and suppress monopolistic behavior,safeguard consumer interests,and social public interests,the administrative organ's determination of the vertical monopoly agreement is not the same as the actual losses caused by a single civil subject's assertion of monopolistic behavior.According to Article 50 of the Anti monopoly Law,"If an operator conducts a monopolistic act and causes losses to others,it shall bear civil liability in accordance with the law."Civil cases involving monopolistic acts shall be premised on causing actual losses,and the actual losses shall be premised on the fact that the monopolistic act has or has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.The legal liability stipulated in Article 46 of the Anti monopoly Law distinguishes between"those who have reached and implemented a monopoly agreement"and"those who have not yet implemented the reached monopoly agreement".The appellant,Hainan Provincial Price Bureau,based on the monopoly agreement reached between Yutai Company and the distributor,but the distributor has not sold fish feed at the fixed price of Yutai Company,and Yutai Company actively cooperates with the investigation during the investigation process The administrative penalty imposed on Yutai under circumstances such as proactive rectification meets the legal requirements,which means that the Appellant's Hainan Provincial Price Bureau does not need to make a decision on administrative penalty involving the case on the premise that the agreement reached between Yutai and the dealer has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition,let alone causing losses to others.
(This article is translated by software translator for reference only.)
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